Three Approaches to Finding the Social in the Linguistic

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1. Introduction: 6 questions, 1 challenge, 1 proposal, 1 answer, and 3 approaches

Sociolinguistics is not one discipline. It is a growing multilingual collection of research methodologies with distinct objects, dissimilar agendas, and differing points of origin. Consider, for instance, the Ethnography of Speaking or Variationist Sociolinguistics or the Sociology of Language or Critical Discourse Analysis or Conversation Analysis or Linguistic Anthropology or Interactional Sociolinguistics, to name a few. This diversity makes it difficult to provide a unifying definition of sociolinguistics. Even so, in the textbooks of Silva-Corvalán (2001:1) and Wardhaugh (2002:9-10), we find insightful definitions that give us a place to begin.

In practice, I take any definition of the general scope and aim of sociolinguistics less as an answer to the question of “What is Sociolinguistics?” and more as a basis for asking questions which hint at what sociolinguists do. For example, when defining the field, terms such as ‘social’ as in ‘la organización social’ or ‘social structure’ will emerge as do terms like ‘los hechos lingüísticos’ or ‘linguistic structure.’ These combinations of key terms suggest a question or three.

Question #1:
If sociolinguistics is a subdiscipline of linguistics, how do researchers identify the presence of the social in a linguistic analysis? In other words, how does one find the social in the linguistic?

After all, much linguistic research, in particular generative linguistics, either overtly dismisses social factors or exclusively defines the object of research as “the manner in which language ability is embodied in the human brain” (Jackendoff 1997:2). Such definition may not explicitly dismiss social factors but it does not include them either.

Two other related questions, which build on the first, also come to mind. We may ask not only how one goes about finding the social in the linguistic, but also:

Question #2:
How does one find the linguistic in the social?

Question #3:
In so doing, does one find that the linguistic always has elements of the social or does one find that the social always has elements of the linguistic?

These types of questions gathered particular relevance for me a few years ago. I had been invited to give a talk to the cognitive processing group in the psychology department at the university where I work. Shortly after I began an analysis of the discourse of two nurses and two patients in conflict over prescriptions, a member of the department enthusiastically interrupted me with a challenging question. I paraphrase his question from memory.

A challenge:
Because you are a sociolinguist, you must believe that everything about language is social, don’t you?

Unprepared for the question, I stumbled among three thoughts. My first thought, which I blurted out, was something original like, “No, but I am not prepared to discuss that particular issue here.” My second thought was this. In my experience, quantitative sociolinguistic methodology can be applied to linguistic issues that are not social in any clear or interesting sense. In other words, sociolinguists do not always and only have to investigate issues of language that are social in some fashion. Just as researchers in psycholinguistics may test predictions derived from linguistic theory or...
develop their own theories apart from research in, say, syntax or phonology, so may sociolinguistic researchers also test and falsify or extend aspects of the cognitive agenda found in linguistics generally and pragmatics or psycholinguistics specifically. My third thought was, “Nihongo!”

Consider these observations on basic constituent order in English and Japanese which I have taken from an early edition of the textbook, Language Files (Godby, et.al. 1982).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>English:</th>
<th>Japanese:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John ate an apple.</td>
<td>John-ga ringo-o tabeta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(SV / SVO)</td>
<td>(SV / SOV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(John came)</td>
<td>(John apple ate)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In both English and Japanese, when a verb is intransitive, we find an SV order of sentence constituents. But, when the verb is a transitive verb the order differs. English is SVO whereas Japanese is SOV. Likewise, when the transitive verb requires two objects, the order for English is SVO whereas for Japanese it is SOV.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>English:</th>
<th>Japanese:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The teacher gave a book to the student.</td>
<td>Sensei-ga seito-ni hon-o ageta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(SVO)</td>
<td>(SOV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Teacher student-to book gave)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For our purposes, we could ask why Japanese has SOV ordering and English an order of SVO? Consider the following proposed social explanation which occurred to me one day after being lectured, yet again, by a cultural studies colleague on the absolute necessity to include ‘culture’ in any analysis of language.

Japanese individuals, relative to native speakers of English in Anglo cultures, are more hesitant to act individually. They prefer to consult with others and seek group agreement. This cultural practice results in a postponing of verb placement in a sentence until the very end. Verbs express action. Therefore, the cultural practice of hesitating to act influences word order in Japanese sentences.

I hope that this explanation sounds absurd. In addition to SOV constituent ordering, Japanese has postpositions and left-branching relative clauses. English, with SVO constituent ordering, has prepositions and right-branching relative clauses. This specific implicational relationship has been found in numerous languages. Do we wish to say that the Japanese preference for group consultation results in postpositions and left-branching relative clauses as well? Indeed, it is unclear to me why we would need to nor how we could incorporate the concept of culture into a synchronic structural analysis of language-internal implicational relationships as may hold between basic constituent order, the presence of pre- or postpositions, and the direction of branching in relative clauses.

This social account of Japanese word order, until now, has remained unpublished. For a published social explanation of a related issue, consider the work of Crabb. In "A comparative study of word order in Old Spanish and Old French prose works" (1955:xi) Crabb reported the results of a study of word order change that occurred in French but, supposedly, not in Spanish. At one point, both languages provided textual evidence of SVO, VOS, or OVS orderings of sentence constituents. Modern French, according to Crabb, is basically an SVO language whereas Spanish retained the other possibilities. In summarizing previous studies of this issue, Crabb paraphrased one social explanation.

"...the French passion for logic and good taste set the pace for the logical (i.e., non-inverted) w. o. of the language after the Seventeenth Century; the impulsive, unfettered character of Spanish personality... is reflected in the Spanish flair for inversion..."

The term of ‘non-inverted’ means SVO, the abbreviation of ‘w.o.’ means word order, and the term of ‘inversion’ refers to constituent orderings of VOS or OVS.

I will assume, again, that this explanation of language change will sound highly suspicious to the reader. However, I will let you figure out what makes this account dubious. Instead, let me provide a modest proposal, one which may generate considerable disagreement, but which reflects the practice of many linguists and sociologists.

**A proposal:**

Just as not all that is linguistic involves the social, neither does all that is social involve the linguistic.

If we accept this proposal, and if we feel uncomfortable about the two examples of social
explanation of linguistic phenomena that I have provided, we will find ourselves in a position where we can ask one question which will trigger others.

**Question #4:**
What counts as a reasonable social explanation of language structure or use?
I do not have a good answer to this. I will also suggest that this is an open, unresolved question (Everett 2005). Yet, it seems clear that in order to answer this question, we need to identify what would count as ‘the social’ in a reasonable social explanation or social description. In other words, we can ask yet another question.

**Question #5:**
What does the ‘socio-’ in sociolinguistics mean?
In current sociolinguistics, I believe that the ‘socio-’ in sociolinguistics can refer to three things, either individually or in combination. The ‘socio-‘ in sociolinguistics may refer to:
♦ an act or action of language use that requires, minimally, two people for its performance or one person acting as two.
♦ language use that is connected to the identity or identities, be they achieved or attributed, of a speaker or speakers.
♦ language use that is involved in the expression of ideology.
In summary, the ‘socio-‘ in sociolinguistics means acts or actions requiring two people, identities, and/or ideologies, all of which require analysis of language use for their description and explanation.
With this working definition in place, we may ask yet another question.

**Question #6:**
How do researchers find the social in sociolinguistics?
In current sociolinguistic research, it appears that there exist at least three fundamental approaches to finding the social in sociolinguistics. Each of them involves a positioning of the social with respect to the linguistic or the linguistic with respect to the social. I list them here before providing discussion.

♦ **Indexicality Approach:** One may find the social as indexed by forms, codes, or acts.
♦ **Constraint Approach:** One may find the social as extra-linguistic constraints or conditions on use.
♦ **Discursive Construction Approach:** One may find the social in the explicit and inferrable details of collaborative, sequential, discursive construction.
What do I mean by these three approaches? In what remains of this article, I will first discuss, briefly, each approach. Each discussion will be prefaced with quotes from an original theorist. After this, we will turn to examples of data analysis which, I hope, will make clear how I understand these approaches. We first look at terms of address and summons from a Puerto Rican Pentecostal church which involve the Indexicality Approach. Then, data on variation in Puerto Rican Spanish will illustrate the Constraint Approach. Finally we will look at a backstage comment, made in English, by a nurse to me. My analysis of this comment will go towards illustrating the Discursive Construction Approach.

2. **Indexicality Approach: Finding the social as indexed by forms, codes, or acts**

The analyst finds forms, codes, or acts which index acts, identities, and/or ideologies.

Indexicality, or the study of deixis, as a topic of research has a long history in philosophy, beginning with Peirce. Consider these statements from Peirce as found in the edition of his papers by Hartshorne and Weiss (1932). I have underlined key terms.

Chapter 2: Division of Signs:
P. 137: “If the Sign be an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object, the two in their Existence being one whole or part of such whole.”

Chapter 3: The Icon, Index, and Symbol:
P. 162: “The demonstrative pronouns, “this” and “that,” are indices. For they call upon the hearer to use his powers of observation, and so establish a real connection between his mind and the object.”
P. 163: “Some indices are more or less detailed directions for what the hearer is to do in order to place himself in direct experiential or other connection with the thing meant.”
Bar-Hillel’s (1954) later discussion of “Indexical Expressions” is also an important starting point. Such work, in addition to that of Grice (1975), gave rise to what we now call the field of Pragmatics. Yet, researchers in Semantics also have turned their attention to indexicals, as you can see in the introductory textbook of Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000). Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet base their discussion primarily on the work of the language philosopher, Kaplan (1989). Kaplan identifies indexicals as the set of linguistic expressions that include personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, and temporal adverbs and adjectives. Tense is also usually cited in the semantic literature as indexical.

Although Kaplan’s discussion is extensive, he provides a few statements that may serve as summary points. For example, he notes that for indexicals, (1989:490), “the referent is dependent on the context of use and that the meaning of the word provides a rule which determines the referent in terms of certain aspects of the context.” In other words, the meaning of an indexical is the function which systematically connects the indexical expression with its referent in the context of language use. Kaplan also distinguishes the referent itself from the meaning of the indexical. In other words, the meaning of an indexical is the function itself, not the various contextual instantiations of the referent. For example, to say, “Yo trabajo en la sociolingüística.” (I work in sociolinguistics.) , the pronoun ‘Yo’ (I), may be understood in this instance to refer to the speaker of this utterance, Richard Cameron, at this point in time. However, the meaning of ‘Yo’ is not Richard Cameron at this point in time. It is the function which a competent speaker of Spanish will know when he or she knows the expression ‘Yo’ and which enables both speaker and listener to identify in this context that ‘Yo,’ Richard Cameron, am the intended referent. In effect, then, the meaning of an indexical, as a function, is independent of contexts of use. This kind of analysis is, of course, in keeping with the general goals of semantics which we may summarize in terms of identifying what a competent speaker knows about meaning when he or she knows a language. This knowledge will also be identified as independent of actual instances of use even as much of it is acquired and displayed in contexts of actual use.

One more note about functions. A function is, essentially, a form of procedural knowledge which connects, in terms borrowed from Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000:80) “specified inputs and outputs such that for any given input there is a unique and corresponding output.” Functions, in turn, have particular formal properties in terms of the relationship between inputs and outputs. They are either one input to one output or many inputs to one output, but not one to many.

Sociolinguistic approaches to indexicality (Silverstein 1976, 2003) overlap with those in semantics but differ in a few key ways. The set of items that are identified as being indexical include Kaplan’s set, but, according to Hanks (2000:124-125) also would include regional dialect features and linguistic indicators of deference. As such, sociolinguists entertain and analyze a wider set of indexicals to the extent that Hanks himself has noted that, “the sheer variety of things the term is applied to, raise the question of whether there is any significant unity to the category.” I will suggest, then, that sociolinguistic approaches to indexicality shift the analytic focus away from an articulation of functions, as we find in semantics and language philosophy, to an exploration of four things:

One, the forms and acts of language use that may be identified as indexical.

Two, the multiple referents that such indexes may point to, intentionally or unintentionally, in contexts of use.

Three, the discourse contexts in which indexicals occur with the idea that the meaning work which these linguistic elements perform is not solely a consequence of the forms themselves but, as in compositional semantics, is a consequence of these forms in conjunction with previous and subsequent information in the discourse.

Four, relationships that may exist between the multiple referents of an index.

Note that the Indexicality Approach can involve study not solely of one index to one referent or of many indexes to one referent, but also of one index to many referents. Also, as Silverstein (2003) has argued, one may analyze indexes in terms of what he calls first order and second order indexicality. First order indexicality involves the referential relationship between the index and the referent(s). Second order indexicality may involve community members’ ideologies of the referents that are indexed and the indexes which point to them. Recent work in this framework is found in Kiesling (2004) on American English “dude,” Makihara (2005) on the syncretic uses of Spanish and Rapa Nui, Strauss and Eun (2005) on Korean honorifics, and Wong (2005) on the competing uses of the Chinese address term “tongzhi” (comrade) by gay rights activists and tabloid journalists in Hong Kong.
3. **Constraint Approach: Finding the social as extra-linguistic constraint or condition on use**

The analyst finds acts, identities, and/or ideologies which constrain or condition the selection of and/or felicitous use of set-related forms, structures, acts, styles, dialects, or languages. In statistical terms, constraints are factors, external to the data set, which influence selections within the set. Call them correlations.

Like the study of Indexicality, the conception of social facts as constraints or conditions on behavior has a long history in sociology with its initial statement found in Durkheim’s famous essay entitled "What is a social fact?" Consider this definition from Durkheim as found in the volume edited by Lukes (1982). I have underlined key terms.

P. 59: "Our definition...A social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint; or, which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations."

For a researcher who intersperses the terms of correlation and constraint, see Labov’s early work.

Labov (1966:43) “...we will show that a person’s occupation is more closely correlated with his linguistic behavior – for those working actively– than any other single social characteristic.”

Labov (1969:730): “The single most important constraint on deletion in NNE, and upon contraction in SE and NNE, is one which we did not expect: whether or not the subject is a pronoun or some other noun phrase. “

The Constraint Approach is found in Variationist Sociolinguistics, the Sociology of Language and in the use of Felicity Conditions in work on performative speech acts. Here, the presence of social constraint or structure is identified through a correlation between patterned or felicitious language use and the extralinguistic social categories which provide the basis for the pattern or the felicity. The social categories are what Collins (1981:984) once called “social processes often treated as self-subsistent entities” such as class, network, domain, or role. In Variationist research, the presence of social constraint or structure is manifested in the differing frequencies or probabilities of language forms which correlate to different categories of attributed social identity such as age, class, or gender. Similar, though not statistically driven, research is found in Hornberger’s (1988:100-115) use of domains, settings, and role relationships to make generalizations about when Quechua-Spanish bilinguals in Peru favor Quechua, Spanish, or a code switching combination. Finally, the Constraint Approach is inherent in Austin’s (1962) discussion of such performative speech acts as Verdictives, the success of which requires that the speaker be endowed with a particular institutional authority. Consider his assertion (p.88-89) that “if you are a judge and say ‘I hold that.’ then to say you hold is to hold; with less official persons it is not so clearly so.” This is similar to Firth’s earlier claim (1935:69) that in certain situations, “words, often conventionally fixed by law or custom, serve to bind people to a line of action.” If people are bound, they are constrained. Accordingly, the felicity of the act depends on the extralinguistic social identity of the speaker.

For recent work using the Constraint Approach see Aaron (2004), Aaron and Torres Cacoullos (2005), or any of the insightful dissertations from Flores Ferrán (2002), Hoffman (2004), Orozco (2004), and Sanchez (2005). Also see Giddens (1984:172-174) for a revision of Durkheim’s social facts as entailing both “constraint” and “enablement”, a point pursued in Cameron (2005a).

Before we move on to the third approach, it may be useful to talk briefly about two related questions. In attempting to understand what sociolinguists do, at times I have tried to distill the field down to a few key questions. When talking about linguistics broadly, I think we can say that much of linguistics emerges from questions like:

**Starter Questions for Linguistics**
- When you know a language, what do you know?
- How do you come to have this knowledge?
- What do you do when you use a language?
- How do languages change?
In a similar fashion, I had once thought that Sociolinguistics could be generated from two
questions.

One Starter Question for Sociolinguistics

When speakers have the option to select between one form or others, one structure or others, one
style or others, or one language or others, what factors influence the speakers’ selections?

This question, of course, presupposes the Constraint Approach which we have just discussed. Notice
that sociolinguistics, in this question, is conceived of as the study of linguistic options or
choices. The factors which influence a speaker’s choice of options, and which give pattern and
systematicity to those choices, are constraints or conditions. In this technical sense, constraints are not
simply inconvenient restrictions on behavior. They provide the basis for recognizing systematic,
patterned behavior or, if you wish, they are constitutive of systematic, patterned behavior. Without
constraints, there is no recognizable system. Returning to Jackendoff’s (1997:2) definition of the
object of generative linguistic study, the recognition of systematic patterns of language use in a
community may also contribute to research into “the manner in which language ability is embodied in
the human brain.” Why? Recognizable, systematic patterns of language use provide a basis for
inferring the content of individuals’ knowledge of language structure and use. This is not a new idea.

A related question can be derived from this starter question. For a period of time, I had thought
that this question naturally led into a discussion of the thi

A Second Starter Question for Sociolinguistics

When speakers have the option to select between one form or others, one structure or others, one
style or others, or one language or others, what are the consequences or results of selecting one
option and not the others?

One result is a construction of meaningful effects, intended or unintended, within the sequence of
interaction in which two or more participants are jointly involved. Nevertheless, this question also
presupposes that, as part of our sociolinguistic analysis, we identify the set of options available to a
speaker, at any given juncture in an unfolding discourse, and then clearly identify what would happen
if option 1 were chosen and not options 2 or 3, or option 2 and not options 1 or 3, or option 3 etc. But,
researchers operating within the Discursive Construction Approach do not always or usually do this. In
other words, unlike the Constraint Approach, the analysis of set related options and their consequences
are not an essential element, though a possible one, of the approach I am terming Discursive
Construction. Therefore, what do I mean or understand by this approach?

4. Discursive Construction Approach: Finding the social in the explicit and
inferrable details of collaborative, sequential, discursive construction

The analyst looks at sequential linguistic interactions with an eye towards (1) knowledge and
practice of actions, identities or ideologies which are presupposed during or exist prior to the
interaction and (2) actions, identities, and ideologies which are (re-)produced or constructed on-line
during and as a consequence of what participants do within the sequence of interaction. For early
statements which foreshadow the approach of Discursive Construction, consider the following from
Simmel as found in Wolff’s (1950) edition of his works. I have underlined key terms.

P. 9-10: "... there exists an immeasurable number of less conspicuous forms of relationship and
kinds of interaction. Taken singly, they may appear negligible..., they alone produce society as we
know it... Sociation continuously emerges and ceases and emerges again. ... the whole gamut of
relations that play from one person to another and that may be momentary or permanent,
conscious or unconscious, ephemeral or of grave consequence.. all these incessantly tie men
together."

Unlike the approaches of Indexicality or Constraint, the approach of Discursive Construction,
resists summary definition. Moreover, it is practiced by a very wide and heterogenous group of
disciplines such as Critical Discourse Analysis, Interactional Sociolinguistics, Social Psychology,
Cognitive Sociology, Discursive Psychology, Linguistic Anthropology, Symbolic Interactionism,
Ethnomethodology, and Conversation Analysis among others. Yet, relative to the previous two
approaches, what essentially distinguishes the approach of Discursive Construction is a central assumption of an interaction between social structure and individual agency. In other words, big social categories partially emerge from actions within collaborative interaction and these interactions emerge within the framework of these big social categories. Or, to play with the quote from Simmel, society as we know it emerges from an immeasurable number of interactions, some conspicuous, others very inconspicuous and mundane. And, these interactions emerge within society.

Therefore, the objects of study may include the microsociological details of the situated, emergent, negotiated, co-constructed, and sequential character of talk-in-interaction. This is what Collins (1981: 984) identified as “the detailed analysis of what people do, say, and think in the actual flow of momentary experience.” On the other hand, large scale social identities and group ideologies may be made manifest in public text types, the content and structural characteristics of which also lend themselves to discourse analysis (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999). In either case, as social actors enact social identities, they do so in ways that suggest knowledge of and orientation to one or more institutional frameworks. Hence, an interaction exists between the discursive construction of social identities and the institutional frameworks which provide context. This is what Giddens’ argued (1979:144), in his discussion of structuration theory, where he stated that social actors “draw upon that framework in producing their action at the same time as they reconstitute it through that action.” Fairclough and Wodak (1997:258) provide similar claims in their overview of Critical Discourse Analysis. To assume an interaction between structure and agency is to further presuppose two other relevant assumptions.

First, social frameworks exist prior to the actors’ action both as institutional practices and actor knowledge (Sewell 1992). If these frameworks did not exist prior to action, actors could not draw upon them. The conception of prior existing practice and knowledge is not unique to the writings of Giddens. Consider Bourdieu’s (1977:72) well known concept of habitus. Cognitive psychologists, philosophers, and anthropologists have long evoked such related concepts as scripts, schemas, frames, common ground, mutual knowledge, encyclopedic knowledge, or socio-cultural knowledge (Davidson 2002, Lee 2001, and Stalnaker 2002). A role for such knowledge in discourse is also implicit in Lewis’ (1979) influential concept of accommodation for presupposition. Lewis noted that a presupposition, not present at a given point in a conversation, may be supplied by a conversational participant to insure coherence and appropriateness. Yet, such ability depends on the participant having sufficient experience and knowledge from which to draw this presupposition.

To the extent, then, that social frameworks (as knowledge or practice) may be drawn upon by actors, these actors may also employ language forms and acts which admit analysis similar to the Indexicality Approach for finding the social in the linguistic. For instance, Drew and Heritage (1992:30) review research into uses of first person plural ‘we’ where the pronoun is used to “invoke an institutional over a personal identity” in institutional contexts. Likewise, question and answer sequences of courtroom discourse index both the social and moral organization of courtrooms whereby some are required to ask questions and others to answer them. In turn, as social actors construct their situated identities, they may be constrained by such micro level requirements as those of turn taking or genre or by macro level definitions of which types of questions or genres are possible. Hence, in courtroom discourse, as Matoesian (1993:207) has observed, a lawyer is not permitted to ask certain types of questions just as a witness is not permitted to answer questions “in any way she pleases.” These constraints may lend themselves to description according to the Constraint Approach.

Yet, not all is constraint. In another of Matoesian’s investigations (1999) of trial interaction, he identified the linguistic resources used by a defendant as he shifted into and out of an expert identity within the sequential opportunities provided to him by the prosecutor. Hence, defendant identity alternated with an expert identity in the co-constructed flow of discourse. Although the interaction was constrained by courtroom procedure, the interaction itself also enabled the defendant’s footing shifts (Goffman 1981) and discursive constructions of shifting identity. This brings us to the second implication of the assumed interaction.

Second, social frameworks are the result of and are constituted by the acts of actors. In short, they are the products of agency. For instance, as Matoesian (1993:205-206) has pointed out, even as social actors shift into and out of social identities in the moment-by-moment flow of discourse, the talk created constitutes the very work of the court. This assumption is not new, of course, and is similar to the Conversation Analytic conception of social identities as the processes and products of interactional accomplishment or performance (Garfinkel 1967 and Schegloff 1986). It is also present in such
pragmatic work as Clark and Marshall (1981) in their work on the interaction of mutual knowledge and definite reference. Specifically, in their critique of the Location Theory of definite reference, they noted (p. 24-25) that not only may mutual knowledge be drawn upon in the act of definite reference, but a given speaker, via an act of definite reference, may create mutual knowledge which had not existed up to that moment. In this line of research, then, discourse is defined as talk-in-interaction which (re-)produces social action, identity, and/or ideology even as it draws upon these elements.

As these notes indicate, the sources of these ideas are multiple. However, one overlooked and perhaps original articulation of the role of interaction in social reproduction may very well be found in the writings of Georg Simmel, a sociologist, and contemporary of Durkheim. For recent work relevant to this research approach, see Del-Teso-Carviotto (2006) on the interactional negotiation of desire or Koike and Graham (2006) for research into the co-construction of Latino identities in political debate. Also see Wei (2005) on the sequential character of code-switching.

Before turning to three illustrations of these approaches, it may be useful to add a caveat. I have written of these three approaches in ways that may indicate that they are mutually exclusive of one another, even though I did point to places in a Discursive Constructionist analysis where both Indexicality and Constraint are relevant. However, it seems clear to me that the boundaries between the three approaches are fluid. Consider the work of Bell (1984) and Schilling-Estes (1998) on initiative or speaker-design approaches to variationist based models of style shifting. Their work borrows from conceptions found in the Discursive Construction approach. Likewise, work in Indexicality indicates that the use of certain indexes may bring about discursive constructions “in performative realtime”, as Silverstein has argued (2003:226). Thus, in practice, researchers may and do incorporate aspects from all approaches.

5. An Illustration of the Indexicality Approach: A set of Puerto Rican Pentecostal terms of address and summons

In the Puerto Rican communities of Philadelphia, one may find a number of small but active pentecostal churches in a variety of building types. From November of 1986 through March of 1987, I became a participant observer in one active and growing church called La Iglesia Cristo Misionera. At the time of my fieldwork, the church was housed in a three-story brownstone house. The first floor served as the church. In the basement, Sunday school classes were held. On the second and third floors lived the Pastor and his family.

During the course of my research, I noticed forms of address and summons that were used by church members in face-to-face interactions or when a church member would address the congregation from the altar at the front of the church. I distinguish here between forms of address and summons because a summons gets someone's attention so that they may be addressed whereas an address form is used directly to an attending addressee. The linguistic expressions of these two are related in that certain summons forms may be derived from those of address by adding a definite article. For instance, the direct address form of "Hermano Pastor" (Brother Pastor) may be converted into the summons form by adding "El" (the) to create "El Hermano Pastor." See Figure 1.

Figure 1: Four Sets of Terms of Address and Summons in La Iglesia Cristo Misionera

| Set 1       | (La) Hermana + First Name | = | (The) Sister + First Name |
| Set 2       | (El) Hermano + First Name | = | (The) Brother + First Name |
| Set 3       | La hija de Hermano/a + First Name | = | The daughter of Brother/Sister + First Name |
| Set 4       | First name (Last names)   |   | The son of Brother/Sister + First Name |

When adults or teenagers spoke from the front of the church to the congregation during a Culto or
religious service, all four sets were used to summon an individual to the altar in order to do various things such as read from the Bible, sing a song, give an announcement, or recount a testimonial. For purposes of direct address, only Sets 1, 2, and 4 were used. However, the terms were not used indiscriminately.

The individuals who were summoned by these terms clearly differed in age and stage of life. Set 1 was used to summon or address adults. Sets 1 and 2 were used primarily to summon teenagers, though Set 2 was favored by adults when summoning or addressing a teenager. Teenagers themselves also could use Set 1 to summon another teenager. Set 3 was used to summon children under the age of 12. Finally, Set 4 was used if and only if the addressee was a member of the speaker’s immediate family. I should add that I saw no pre-teenage children address the congregation. Thus, this analysis focuses only on adults and teenagers as users of these terms. Moreover, I focus my analysis primarily on the act of address or summons when the speaker stands at the altar before the congregation.

These initial observations enable us to identify two social categories of importance which are indexed by these terms of address and summons: Degrees of Intimacy and Degrees of Age.

In order to first discuss indexing Degrees of Intimacy between speaker and addressee, it will be useful to introduce a few key quotes from Berger & Luckmann, (1967: 131, 138-147) on Primary and Secondary Socialization. These provide us with a frame for interpretation.

(P. 130): “Primary socialization is the first socialization an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a member of society. Secondary socialization is any subsequent process that inducts an already socialized individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society.”

(P. 131): “It is at once evident that primary socialization is usually the most important one for an individual and that the basic structure of all secondary socialization has to resemble that of primary socialization.”

(P. 138): “Secondary socialization is the internalization of institutional or institution-based ‘subworlds.’ Its extent and character are therefore determined by the complexity of the division of labor and the concomitant social distribution of knowledge.”

How are these quotes relevant? I will assume that a given speaker’s knowledge of members of his or her own family is more intimate and informed than the speaker’s knowledge of non-family members within the church community. In terms of socialization, members of one’s family would be identified as a primary socializing group. Therefore, when a speaker uses the form of First Name for address or summons, this form indexes a relationship of familial intimacy between speaker and addressee. And, it also indexes shared membership in the group which Berger and Luckmann would identify as the primary socializer. On the other hand, when a speaker uses one of the specialized address forms (Sets 1, 2, and 3) to address or summon an individual within the church, the form not only indexes membership in the church community, which would count as a secondary socializer, but also indexes a lack of familial intimacy and relationship between the speaker and the addressee. Nevertheless, the terms created for indexing membership in this secondary group relative to the speaker are semantically derived from relationships found in the first. This occurs most clearly in the terms of Hermano or Hermana + First Name where Hermano/a (Brother/Sister) further index a sibling relationship. Also, when young children are summoned, they are specifically identified by their familial relationship as the son or daughter of a church member. The use of Joven + First Name differs and requires analysis within the framework of age. The specialized address forms appear to support, in a virtual fashion, one of Berger and Luckman's claims (p. 131) that "the basic structure of all secondary socialization has to resemble that of primary socialization." Here, the resemblance is achieved linguistically because the terms of Hermano /Hermana (Brother /Sister) further index the sibling relationship of the primary socializing group. For graphic illustration of the arguments here, see Figure 2.
Figure 2: Degree of Intimacy between Speaker & Addressee or One Summoned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set 1</th>
<th>(La/El) Hermana/o + First Name</th>
<th>index »</th>
<th>- Intimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Set 2</td>
<td>(La/El) Joven + First Name</td>
<td>index »</td>
<td>- Intimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set 3</td>
<td>La/El hija/o de Hermano/a + First Name</td>
<td>index »</td>
<td>- Intimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set 4:</td>
<td>First name (Last names)</td>
<td>index »</td>
<td>+ Intimate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Speaker to Addressee = - Intimate: Sets 1, 2, and 3  parallels  Secondary Socialization
Speaker to Addressee = +Intimate: Set 4  parallels  Primary Socialization

Terms created for the Secondary Group borrow directly from relationships which characterize the Primary Group: Siblings (Hermana/o) or Parent-Child (La/El hija/o de Hermano/a + First Name)

What about the age differences? Why don't members of the church address or summon all non-intimates by the terms Hermano or Hermana plus First Name? Consider the last quote from Berger and Luckman. They claim that the character of secondary socialization is determined "by the complexity of the division of labor and the concomitant social distribution of knowledge." Assuming that the church is a site of secondary socialization, we could expect that the church community would show both a division of labor and a social distribution of knowledge among its members. What would be the labor that is divided or the knowledge that is distributed? Judging from my experiences and conversations with various members of the church, I will suggest that for most adult and teenage members of the church, their major sense of the church’s labor is that of understanding God and putting into practice that knowledge. Moreover, various adults, including the pastor, expressed the belief that before the age of 12 a child is clearly incapable of understanding the significance or consequences of religious belief. Adults, once involved and committed to the church, were assumed to clearly have the capacity to understand. Moreover, an adult’s commitment to the Pentecostal version of Christian belief was identified as providing a kind of religious protection which extended to their children. In effect, adults could serve as religious proxies for their children. Teenagers were identified as in between, meaning they varied in their capacities of understanding and in their need of adult proxies. Thus, the capacity for knowledge and for practice were described as being distributed differently among church participants according to the three age groups of Adults, Teenagers, and Children under the age of 12. If this is the case, how might a division of labor about God or a social distribution of knowledge of God be acknowledged in the church?

Return to the differing forms of address for adults, teenagers, and pre-teens as found in Sets 1, 2, and 3. In the form of summons for the children under the age of 12, we find that the primary form combines terms which identify them as a son or daughter (El hijo de../ La hija de..) of an adult member who is identified by name and church title as in Hermano Rafael or Hermana Diana. Notice that the child remains unnamed though identified. If the speaker knew the child’s first name, he could use that first name but this would usually occur after first summoning the child. Thus, if children are assumed to lack the capacity to understand the significance of religious belief and practice, and if their parents serve as proxies for them, we see how this form of a summons indexes these features. The lack of the child’s name indexes the assumed lack of religious understanding. The familial relational terms index the relationship to the parent who, by virtue of expressed faith, serves as a knowing proxy for the unknowing child. Adults will receive Hermano/a + First Name because they are assumed to have the capacity to understand the significance of God’s presence in the world. The address or summon form for an adult, then, also indexes their presupposed ability to understand or to act on that knowledge. The ambiguous apprentice or transitional status of teenagers was indexed in the following fashion. From adults and other teenagers, teenagers would receive the form of Joven + First Name. However, some teenagers, though no adults, would also address or summon other teenagers with the forms of Hermano/a + First Name. In practice, teenagers could be variably addressed or summoned with two forms, one of which, Hermano/a + First Name, would eventually come to replace the other, Joven + First Name, upon reaching adulthood. This pattern of alternating forms, then, indexes the apprentice or transitional status of the teenagers. Moreover, the teenagers’ use of Hermano/a + First Name creatively indexes “in performative realtime” (Silverstein 2003:226) their claim to knowledge and a place within the division of labor of the church. See Figure 3 for graphic illustration of this argument.
Recall Berger and Luckman on Secondary Socialization: “...the complexity of the division of labor and the concomitant social distribution of knowledge.”

Stratification of Age in Forms » indexes » division of labor and social distribution of knowledge of understanding and practicing religious faith within the church {Adults know, Teens almost know, Children don’t know, but have Adult proxies.}

In brief, this set of terms used for address and summons not only index specific individuals, but also index degrees of intimacy, between speaker and addressee, as well as the addressee’s membership in the primary or secondary socializing groups of the speaker. In addition, these terms index a given individual’s age or stage of life, as conceived by the church. The differing age groups constitute a social stratification with respect to religious labor in which knowledge and understanding are believed to be distributed differently among the age groups.

6. An Illustration of the Constraint Approach: Intervocalic (d) in Puerto Rican Spanish at the intersection of age and gender

When we turn to the study of variation, we engage in a different approach. Central to variationist research, of course, is the tool of the sociolinguistic variable. A sociolinguistic variable occurs in a language when speakers have two or more ways of saying or accomplishing the same thing. One example from Puerto Rican Spanish is found in the pronunciation of intervocalic (d), as in words like ‘lado’ which may alternately be pronounced as ‘lao’ The variable of intervocalic (d), as I have found it, has two variants in speech: a voiced fricative, close to an interdental, which I represent as [ð] and the deleted variant of [0]. The analyst quantifies the total number of times that each variant of the variable occurs and derives the frequency of occurrence of each variant relative to the overall number of possible occurrences of the variable. Using simple fractions as a model, the quantities of each individual variant would be a numerator over the total number which would serve as the denominator. In the process, different social groups, to which individual speakers may belong, can serve as constraints or the basis for statistical correlations. For instance, from a study of intervocalic (d) among 62 speakers of Spanish from San Juan (Cameron 2005a), we may produce the data represented in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Variants]</th>
<th>[ð]</th>
<th>[0]</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>N of Interviewees per Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>1177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>1050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1570</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>2227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall, the 62 speakers produce the fricative variant 70% of the time. See the bottom lines of Total N and %. If we introduce two gender groups into our analysis, the categories of female and male constrain and give pattern to the data in ways which reveal the systematic influences of one aspect of social identity on the production of linguistic forms in the community. I assume here, of course, that attributed gender type is one important aspect of social identity. Statistically, in this case, it clearly is. Female speakers favor the fricative 80% of the time whereas males do so 60%. The difference obtains a chi-square value of 111.09 which is significant at the level of .001 thereby clearly allowing us to reject the hypothesis that there is no difference between the two groups. Because the fricative variant is the standard variant, we may say that female speakers, relative to males, favor the standard variant and males, relative to females, favor the nonstandard one because the males, overall, show a higher frequency of nonstandard use. This is a frequently cited finding which is extensively and insightfully discussed by Labov (1990).

In doing research like this, some possible kinds of questions do not usually get asked. For instance, it may not be helpful to ask:

- Why does this sample of speakers produce the variant of [ð] 70% of the time?
- Why not 73.4 % of the time?
- Why do the male speakers produce this variant of [ð] 60% of the time?
- Why do the female speakers produce the variant of [0] 20% of the time?

Instead, questions which involve a social relationship of more or less are posed. Thus, researchers ask questions like these:

- Why do female speakers favor the variant of [ð] relative to the male speakers?
- Why do male speakers favor the variant of [0] relative to the female speakers?

In order to speak more generally about variationist projects, it is useful to make explicit a few assumptions about research in general and science in particular. I assume that scientific research has three broad purposes. We seek to explore things. We seek to describe these things in revealing ways. And, we seek to explain these things and/or the relationships that may exist among them. Using these assumptions, we can classify variationist research into two broad types. The first, I will call the Variationist Approach as Discovery Technique. The second, I term the Variationist Approach as Quantitative Test of Theory.

In the Variationist Approach as Discovery Technique, there is a recognizable sequence of events. We find data and patterns first. Then, we attempt to account for them. In practice, this type of variationist work is exploratory and descriptive. It generates facts in search of explanation. In the Variationist Approach as Quantitative Test of Theory, at least in terms of argument structure, theory and explanation come first, data comes second. In practice, we predict social patterns, identified in terms of social constraints or correlations, in such a way that if the prediction is supported, we also have a basis for reasonably explaining the findings. If the prediction is not supported, we reject the falsified hypothesis which the prediction embodies. If the prediction finds partial support, we revise and move on until disconfirming evidence appears or a better alternative explanation is provided. Other questions and new predictions may also become apparent. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Quantitative tests of theory require previous or parallel exploratory and descriptive work. In other words, if theory goes towards explaining facts, we first must know what facts there are that need to be explained.

Having stated a few obvious points about research, let me now give one example of variationist research in which theory is tested quantitatively. The linguistic object will be the variable of Intervocalic (ð) in Puerto Rican Spanish at the intersection of age and gender. I base this directly on the much wider study found in Cameron (2005a). We will begin with a few observations.

Numerous investigators of play, friendship, and affiliation among females and males have found gender segregation in a wide range of societies. As children and adults, boys and girls, women and men, will segregate or separate themselves or will be segregated or separated to varying degrees. Said differently, females and males are formed into or will form same-gender peer groups. This is first recognizable around the age of three or four in patterns of play. The preference for gender segregation peaks in early adolescence or middle childhood and then lessens in the teenage years. Nevertheless, gender segregation continues into the adult workplace and persists into late life friendships with some variation in advanced old age. Age segregation also occurs at different stages of life as well, being most pronounced early in life and late in life. This pattern roughly parallels the waxing and waning of gender segregation across the life span as well. See Cameron (2005a: 24 - 28) and Strough and Covatto...
Of particular relevance to the issue of gender segregation / separation is Thorne’s (1993:51) observation that, “...where age separation is present, gender separation is more likely to occur.” If this is true, we may use it to generate an explanatory prediction about the variable speech behavior of female and male speakers across the life span. In order to do so, we need more one element. This comes from the longstanding observation on dialect divergence made by Bloomfield (1933:46) that “density of communication,” meaning differing degrees of spoken interaction, results in the “most important differences of speech” within a community. Combining Thorne with Bloomfield, we derive an initial implication in these terms. If females and males tend to separate or be separated from one another in peer groups, their degree of spoken cross-gender interaction will not be as frequent as their interactions with members of the same sex. If less frequent, in line with Bloomfield, we could predict “important differences.”

The implication may be further specified as working hypothesis consisting of three sets of propositions.

(A) The degree of difference in frequency, index, or probability values for sociolinguistic variables between female and male speakers will wax and wane across the life span.

(B) When sex segregation or separation is greatest, the degree of quantitative difference will be the greatest. This will occur when age segregation or separation is also strongly practiced or enforced.

(C) When sex segregation or separation is smallest, the degree of quantitative difference will be the smallest. This will occur when age segregation or separation occurs to a lesser extent.

Armed with the hypothesis, we may now predict the following statistical patterns to be found in the speech of the 62 speakers from San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Across the life span, we will find an irregular u-shaped pattern of gender divergences.

1) The degree of difference among the genders will be greater among Pre-teens than among Teens.

2) The degree of difference among the genders will be greater among Teens than among Working Adults.

3) The degree of difference among the genders will be least among Middle Age, Working Adults.

4) The degree of difference among the genders will be greater among Elderly Adults than among Middle Age, Working Adults.

Using the variable of Intervocalic (d), we may put this prediction to the test. We do this by further subdividing the two gender groups of females and males, initially displayed in Table 1, according to five age groups. These will include preteen children, teenagers, adults between the ages of 20 to 39, 40 to 59, and 60 and higher. See Table 2.
Table 2: Intervocalic (d) by Age and Gender in 62 Speakers from San Juan, Puerto Rico

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>[ð]</th>
<th>[0]</th>
<th>TOTAL Pt Difference, using % of [ð]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preteen Girl</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preteen Boy</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teen Girl</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teen Boy</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/30 Female</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/30 Male</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40/50 Female</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40/50 Male</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 + Female</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 + Male</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1570</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>2227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do we find support for the predictions? If we partially repeat the predictions, we may intersperse specific answers to this question.

1) Degree of difference will be greater among Pre-teens than among Teens.
**No, the prediction does not hold.** (Pre-teen = 21, Teen = 41 pts. of difference.)

2) Degree of difference will be greater among Teens than among Working Adults.
**Yes, the prediction holds.** (Teens = 41, Working Adults = 16 & 12)

3) Degree of difference will be least among Middle Age, Working Adults.
**Yes, the prediction holds.**

4) Degree of difference will be greater among Elderly Adults than among Middle Age, Working Adults.
**Yes. The prediction holds.** (Elderly = 22, Working Adults = 16 & 12)

These findings put us in the interesting position where we can explain some things while also formulating new questions about those points we cannot explain. Specifically, we can explain points 2, 3, and 4 of the predictions, but not point 1. On the assumption that age and gender segregation are more strongly enforced or practiced during the teen years or among the elderly adults than among those in the Middle Age groups, the greater degree of difference among female and male speakers in these two groups, relative to the Middle Age group, follows from this separation. But, we cannot account for the pattern found among the Pre-teens. Thus, we can ask questions and also formulate related testable hypotheses and predictions with increasing focus.

1) Why is the degree of difference smaller between Preteen females and males, contrary to expectation, than the degree of difference among Teenagers?
(2) Why does the degree of difference between females and males increase among the Teenagers relative to the Preteens?
(3) Why is the degree of difference overall between females and males greatest among the Teenagers?
(4) Do such patterns emerge in other dialects of Spanish or in other languages and across differing social class or ethnic groups?

Some answers to these questions are proposed in Cameron (2005a), as is a new prediction found on page 54, endnote #9 which is then pursued in Cameron (2005b)

If the degree of social segregation/separation between girls and boys sequentially increases during pre-adolescence, the frequencies/probabilities/index values of variants of sociolinguistic variables expressed by girls and by boys will also sequentially diverge as they grow up from the early to the later grades of elementary school.

To summarize, we have taken the social categories of female and male as constraints on variable linguistic behavior. The constraints provide a basis for recognizing systematic patterns of language use in the San Juan community. The systematicity of the patterns also permits prediction and some explanation. Where explanation cannot apply, we can clearly see where it does not and then formulate new questions and falsifiable hypotheses. In other words, the method provides a basis for seeing that some statements about language use would be wrong but others would be right. In the process, we engage in socially informed linguistic research which, as I understand it, is also scientific in method and style of argument.

7. An Illustration of the Discursive Construction Approach: Backstage comments about on-stage conflict between patients and care providers

In the third approach to finding the social in the linguistic which I term Discursive Construction for short, we assume that reciprocal influence occurs between the situated, discursive construction of social actions, identities, and ideologies and the institutional frameworks which provide context. In other words, social actors draw upon their knowledge of frameworks of action, identity, or ideology as they in turn reproduce these frameworks in interaction. Much discourse analytic research into medical contexts assumes a similar approach. However, most of this work, by focusing only on face-to-face interactions between patients and care providers, overlooks backstage comments where either patients or care providers comment on their experiences. This leaves us with a question:

How might a patient or a care-provider draw upon and reproduce action, identity, and ideology in backstage comments about on-stage interaction?

The brief backstage discourse, which is our object of study here, comes from an experienced nurse practitioner who I will call Hannah Ryan. Ms. Ryan worked in a community-oriented health clinic where nurse practitioners provided most of the primary care and diagnostic interviewing. I recorded Ms. Ryan in February, 1993 as part of a larger project described in Cameron (1998). Earlier in the day, I had accompanied her during a number of medical consultations with different patients. One male patient, who Ms. Ryan interviewed for the first time, I will call Oscar Pérez. Mr. Pérez, aged 59, was in need of hypertension medicine. Mr. Pérez is the object of the backstage comments. At one point, later in the day, we found ourselves standing in a quiet back hall of the clinic. I had asked her about dealing with difficult patients because finding out about how experienced nurses deal with difficult patients was part of my project.

For purposes of exposition, in the following analysis I refer to myself as Cameron so as to avoid confusing references. All other names are pseudonyms. Owing to limitations of space, I will point out only a few aspects of this discourse which involve social identities, actions, and ideologies.
Backstage comment from Hannah Ryan to Richard Cameron.

1   Ms. Ryan:  When they, you know.....
2    .hh.. Hhh
3    getting, like the guy.
4    He doesn't like taking pills very often,
5    but he likes to regulate what pills he takes.
6
7   Cameron:  (1.18)
8
9   Ms. Ryan: First guy we saw.
10    []
11   Cameron:  hmm
12   Yea, right.
13
14   Cameron:  Yea, I mean it's..like...
15   Those are those are the worst worst kinds, I think,
16   because.. you never know what to do with them,
17   because they're going to do what they want to, anyways.
18   And then they don't tell you what they're doing and...Hhh mm.
19   You feel like saying, "Well, why did you even come to me?", you know. Hhh
20    /laughs/
21
22   Cameron:  /laughs/
23   Ms. Ryan:  "Why'd you even want my opinion?", you know.
24    []
25   Cameron:    Yea.
26
27   Ms. Ryan:  "",We don't really care. "",...
28   Ok?

We may break the discourse into 3 subsections. I will insert these subsections in the subsequent analysis for ease of reference.
Subsection One: Working Together on Anaphor Resolution & Indexing Clinic Organization

1 Ms. Ryan: When they, you know.....
2 .hh..Hhh
3 getting, like the guy.
4 He doesn't like taking pills very often,
5 but he likes to regulate what pills he takes.
6
7 Cameron: (1.18)
8
9 Ms. Ryan: First guy we saw.
10
11 Cameron: hmm
12 Yea, right.
13
14 Ms. Ryan: Yea, I mean it's..like...

Begin with line 3. In line 3, Ms. Ryan introduced a discourse referent, “the guy” which, by itself, lacks sufficient predication to permit the inference of referential identity. Cameron’s brief yet significant silence in line 7 and his overlapped minimal response in line 11 of “hmm” appear to indicate his inability to identify who Ms. Ryan intended “the guy” to refer to. Given this, we may suggest motivation for the subsequent next two turns of Ryan in line 9 and Cameron in line 12. Here, Ms. Ryan continued to work to secure Cameron’s understanding of her intended referent by adding information that she could have expressed, initially, in line 3. The new information which Ms. Ryan added in line 9 also reveals an orientation to and reliance on her shared history with Cameron relative to the sequence of patients they had seen together that morning. By saying, “First guy we saw,” Ms. Ryan used the ordinal predicate of “First” to evoke a temporally ordered set of patients. This temporal order is not simply the doing of Ryan and Cameron. The temporal structure of their shared experience here derives from the clinic’s schedule of patient visits. After all, patients are seen one after the other in real time. Hence, the temporal structuring of the clinic’s daily business serves as the template for the temporally-ordered set. By evoking this temporally-ordered set, Ryan provided Cameron with sufficient predication such that he could successfully infer her intended referent. Cameron’s response of “Yea, right” in line 12 finally indicated, being the next turn at talk, his successful uptake of the referential identity of “the guy” first introduced in line 3. Thus, from lines 1 through 12, we find a collaborative, and thereby social, achievement of anaphor resolution which draws on knowledge of prior social organization and experience.

Subsection Two: Footing Shift, Transforming the Specific into a Type, Control as Problem, & Initiating Moral Evaluation

14 Ms. Ryan: Yea, I mean it's..like...
15 Those are those are the worst worst kinds, I think,
16 because.. you never know what to do with them,
17 because they're going to do what they want to, anyways.
18 And then they don't tell you what they're doing and...Hhh mm.

Line 14 serves as an end to one section and the beginning of another which is triggered by Ms. Ryan’s use of “I mean.” Schiffrin (1987:296) analyzes this discourse marker as frequently prefacing a footing shift of a speaker within the subsequent discourse. In line 15, we see that Ms. Ryan does shift from a discussion of the specific Mr. Perez to a set of patients identified as “the worst worst kinds”. In line 16, she also shifts from discussing herself in the first person singular, as in “I think” of Line 15, to the second person nonspecific or generic you in “you never know what to do with them” in Line 16. Observe that in these two cases, we have gone from particular individuals to groups who, we may infer, given the social context and content of the interaction, are representative of patients and care providers. They are both indexed by pronouns “they” and “you” in combination with information predicated of them by Ms. Ryan and by their place within the sequential unfolding of the discourse. In so doing, Ms. Ryan draws on or presupposes a key relationship of modern medicine: patient and care
provider. She does this through typifying both Mr. Perez (“they”) and herself (“you”).

Such typifications are, apparently, typical of care provider commentary on patient complaints (Allsop and Mulcahy 1998:814). Moreover, as Roth (1981) observed, these typifications often involve moral evaluation. Does Ms. Ryan engage in moral evaluation here? Observe that she identifies this set of patients, of which Mr. Pérez may be a member, as being the “worst worst kinds.” I will assume that to predicate “worst” of a “kind” is to further evaluate them in moral terms relative to the medical context. Also notice that in lines 16 through 18, she adds details which may be understood as further illustrating what makes them the ‘worst.’ The care provider does not know what to do with this kind. This kind does what they wish to even when that contradicts medical advice and they fail to inform their care providers about what they are doing when they do so. The content of Ms. Ryan’s characterizations also provide a basis for inferring what we might call an ideology of the rights and obligations of patients and care providers within the framework of their relationship. Care providers control patients, not the reverse. This brings us, then, to the third subsection of the discourse which builds on the output of the referential transformations of the second.

Subsection Three: Further demonstrating Moral Evaluation of the Type and, by Extension, the Specific via Direct Quotations & Scalar Implicature.

18 Ms. Ryan And then they don’t tell you what they’re doing and...Hhh mm.
19 You feel like saying, "Well, why did you even come to me?", you know. Hhh
20 /laughs/
21
22 Cameron: /laughs/
23 Ms. Ryan: "Why’d you even want my opinion?", you know.
24
25 Cameron: Yea.
26
27 Ms. Ryan: /"/ We don’t really care. /"/
28 Ok?

The third subsection, beginning in line 18, consists of two or three direct quotations, two instances of the scalar operator “even”, two instances of the discourse marker “you know,” and a string of two laughs. Given the recency of the discourse entities which Ms. Ryan constructed in the second subsection, we may infer that the quotations of line 19 and 23 are directed by Ms. Ryan to the typified worst patients. Interpretation of Line 27 depends on resolving the referential identity of the first person plural “We.” I will not address that issue here.

Both lines 19 and 23 include WH-questions. WH questions presuppose propositions in which the WH question word is replaced by an existential variable (Lyons 1995: 188-190). In lieu of logical notation, informally, we may say that both of Ms. Ryan’s questions presuppose the following propositions:

Line 19 (For some reason) You even came to me.
Line 23 (For some reason) You even wanted my opinion.

Why does she use the word ‘even’? According to Kay (1990) and many others, the word ‘even’ implicates a scalar set of ordered propositions which are shared by both speaker and hearer as background knowledge which is either salient at that moment or which may be made salient by introducing the proposition into the discourse. Briefly, an implicated scalar set of propositions occurs when a speaker has said some proposition, call it $p$. Because this proposition falls within the scope of ‘even’, the proposition $p$ is interpreted as an element of a scalar set. This set consists, minimally, of one other proposition which the speaker could have said but did not say explicitly. Call this unspoken, yet implicated other proposition $q$. Within the scalar set, one possible relationship between $p$ and $q$ is that of entailment. This pattern of inference is the much discussed scalar implicature (Levinson 2000:
76-111). For instance, one may say, “Jonathan is a remarkable high jumper. He even cleared 7 feet.” To say that he cleared or jumped over a bar set at 7 feet entails that he also cleared 6 feet. But, to then assert, that he failed to clear 6 feet is logically incoherent because to high jump 7 feet entails having passed the height of 6 feet on the way up and over 7.

Given these ideas, we may ask the following. What proposition has Ms. Ryan implicated as being entailed when a person comes to see her or asks her expert opinion? Briefly, I will assume that she implicated that if a patient comes to see her in order to seek her opinion, the patient will accept the advice which the patient requested. A rejection of the advice will be illogical or irrational because acceptance is entailed. A negated entailment is illogical. Our ability to infer this entailment is, in part, not simply a function of our prior beliefs of what we think is appropriate. Call this a presupposed ideology. Our inference is also a consequence of Ms. Ryan’s use of “even” which serves to structure our inference that the act of requesting advice from an expert further entails accepting that advice.

Notice that this brief analysis also provides a basis for inferring both a shared orientation to forms of typical social action and to what we might call an ideology of expertise. The actions would be those of requesting and advising which we can safely say are two speech acts or routines that are typical in any medical consultation. They are part of our mental scripts of what usually occurs in a medical consultation. The ideology of expertise I will formulate in these terms: Advice given is advice to be taken. If not taken, there is something illogical and wrong with the patient, not with the advice.

Finally here, we may ask how Ms. Ryan, in Giddens terms (1979:144), drew upon the clinical framework in producing these backstage comments at the same time that she reconstituted the clinical framework through her discourse? In other words, how did she draw upon and reproduce action, ideology, and action in these backstage comments about on-stage interaction? She did so in multiple ways.

♦ Anaphor resolution drew upon the clinic’s schedule of patient visits.
♦ Footing shift followed by referential transformation of the specific patient and nurse into nonspecific discourse entities representative of patients and care providers drew upon one key relationship of modern medicine: patient and care provider.
♦ Footing shift followed by comments on the issue of control. Talk of control also permits explicit talk of an implicit ideology of the rights and obligations of patients and care providers. Care providers control patients, not the reverse.
♦ Exchange of direct quotations implicated two speech acts central to medical consultation: requesting and advising.
♦ Inferred rejection of requested advice implicates another element of ideology: Advice given is advice to be taken. If not taken, there is something wrong with the illogical patient, not with the advice.

Hence, we find Ms. Ryan drawing on such social facts as the temporal organization of the clinic’s business, a key role relationship and a key adjacency pair (requesting and advising) of modern medicine, as well as on specifiable ideologies of contemporary medicine.

8. Conclusion

I have not attempted, here, to write a typical article in sociolinguistics of primary and original research. Instead, I have stepped back from the field to ask broad questions about what sociolinguists do with the aim of identifying key research practices, as I understand them. I do not claim that my answers are exhaustive and correct in all their detail. Nor do I expect agreement from all quarters about the claims that I have made. I would like to stand corrected. In fact, I may disagree with myself sometime soon as my own understanding of the field evolves. Nonetheless, the questions I have posed do tap certain key issues. What counts as a social fact in sociolinguistics? How do we reasonably and justifiably incorporate social analysis within linguistic analysis or linguistic analysis within social analysis?
Recently, I have been asked which of the three approaches, Indexicality, Constraint, or Discursive Construction, is the best. Owing to my training in multivariate analysis, I assume that what we know about language and what we do with language have multiple explanations. Moreover, it seems clear to me that our selection of approach is connected to some extent to the linguistic object which we investigate. If we investigate kinship terms or terms of address, the objects themselves point to Indexicality as the most, but not only, relevant approach. If we investigate variation, then the Constraint approach follows, though not absolutely. If our object is talk-in-interaction, then a Discursive Construction approach emerges. Integration, where it is useful, seems the way to go.

References


