Predicates of Personal Taste and Multidimensional Adjectives: An Experimental Investigation

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1. Introduction

There exists a range of linguistic expressions that make reference to the subjective perspective of an individual, including predicates of personal taste (PPTs, e.g. *fun, tasty*) and epithets (e.g. *the idiot*). These expressions have been analyzed as making reference to a 'judge' or 'evaluator' (e.g. Lasersohn 2005, Potts 2007, Stephenson 2007, Patel-Grosz 2012 and many others). Their full interpretation depends on knowing whose judgment, opinion, or knowledge state is being referred to – e.g. who thinks licorice is tasty, or that Bob is an idiot?

(1a) Licorice is tasty.
(1b) Bob missed the train again! The idiot forgot to set the alarm this morning.

Much of the current research on these expressions builds on Lasersohn's (2005) judge parameter j, such that the truth of sentences containing predicates of personal taste is interpreted relative to the particular individual who is the judge.[1] Another case of judge-dependence involves the general class of adjectives often referred to as multidimensional adjectives (e.g. Kamp 1975, Klein 1980, Sassoon 2013, Kennedy 2013, Stojanovic & McNally 2017). Multidimensional adjectives (e.g. *healthy, ugly, beautiful, stupid*) involve multiple criteria for ordering individuals with the property (e.g. for *healthy*: cardiovascular system and immune system). This contrasts with unidimensional adjectives (e.g. *tall, old*), for which "exactly one criterion is used to order individuals according to the property [they] describe" (McNally & Stojanovic 2017:20). McNally and Stojanovic note that in the case of multidimensional adjectives, people can disagree regarding the weight/significance of each dimension, which results in judge dependence (see also Kennedy 2013, Bylinina 2014). For example, is Anne healthier than Bob, if her heart is in better shape than his but she has an immune disorder that he does not have? Multidimensional adjectives contrast with unidimensional adjectives, where people may disagree about the threshold (e.g. how tall does someone have to be to count as 'tall'?) but people's judgments about the orderings of individuals with respect to the particular property are not expected to differ (e.g. see McNally & Stojanovic 2017 for discussion).

It is worth clarifying that adjectives which are standardly viewed as predicates of personal taste (PPTs) can arguably also be multidimensional – for example, I may find someone or something irritating in one regard but not irritating in other aspects. However, not all multidimensional adjectives are PPTs. Making a distinction between PPTs and non-PPT multidimensional adjectives raises the question of how exactly they differ in their semantics. One fundamental claim that has been made in prior theoretical literature is that PPTs crucially involve an *experiencer* argument, whereas multidimensional adjectives that are not PPTs (e.g. *smart, healthy*) do not have an experiencer argument (e.g. Bylinina 2014, McNally

[1] Some argue that the judge is not a variable/parameter, as proposed by Lasersohn (2005) and is instead an argument, which, if not explicitly spelled out, is an implicit argument (PRO or *pro*, according to some) filled in contextually (see Bylinina 2014, Stephenson 2007, see also Pearson 2013 for related discussion). Stojanovic (2007) argues that these two accounts are formally equivalent. Our experiment does not aim to directly investigate this distinction.

& Stojanovic 2017). In essence, for something to be 'tasty', someone must have the experience of tasting it, but for someone to be 'healthy', no such experiencing is necessary (e.g. McNally & Stojanovic 2017).

More explicitly, McNally & Stojanovic (2017) discuss "…the presence (or absence) of an experiencer, that is, a sentient individual who perceives the property in question…" (McNally & Stojanovic 2017:24) and argue for the importance of distinguishing "predicates that entail a proper experiencer from those whose subjective element may be due to differences of opinion over where the threshold for ascribing a property lies or what the relative weights of the different criteria for ascribing it should be" (McNally & Stojanovic 2017:28).

In related work, Bylinina (2014) argues that the "presence or absence of an experiencer argument is orthogonal to judge-dependence" (Bylinina 2014:50). She proposes a separate 'judge=experiencer' requirement, which states that "A direct statement about someone's internal state can be made only if the judge parameter is set to the same value as the experiencer of this internal state" (Bylinina 2014:58). According to Bylinina, this requirement applies to, but is not limited to, PPTs. She gives the following semantics for *tasty*, where the second part states that the judge j and experiencer z refer to the same individual. Bylinina distinguishes adjectives like *tasty* that refer to experience from adjectives like *smart/healthy* which she argues do not refer to experience in the same way.

(2) $[[\text{tasty}]]^{c;w,t,\mathbf{j}} =$
(i) $\lambda z \lambda x. \exists s\ [\textbf{taste}(s)\ \&\ \text{Experiencer}(s, z)\ \&\ \text{Stimulus}(s, x)\ \&\ \text{TASTE}(s) \succ d_{st}$ for j at t in w];
(ii) JUDGE=EXPERIENCER: $j = z$

Generally speaking, the role of experience and the relation between judges and experiencers has received considerable attention in various recent accounts (e.g. Kennedy & Willer 2016, Saebø 2009, Pearson 2013, see also Ninan 2014 on the Acquaintance Inference), which highlights its significance in our understanding of PPTs. However, intuitions regarding the role/contribution/presence of experiencers can be murky (e.g. see McNally & Stojanovic's detailed exploration of aesthetic predicates like 'beautiful'). Existing tests that have been suggested as means of identifying adjectives with judges and/or experiencers – e.g. evaluative use of the *find* construction – do not always appear to provide a reliable diagnostic (see e.g. McNally & Stojanovic 2017, Sæbø 2009, Kennedy 2013, Bylinina 2014:34 for discussion).

2. Aims of the present work

Our study approaches the general question of how to identify adjectives with experiencers from a psycholinguistic/experimental perspective. In this paper, we report an experiment that tests the claim that PPTs entail experiencers, whereas merely multidimensional non-PPT adjectives do not. We do this by means of manipulating verb argument structure – in particular, we compare contexts containing verbs that introduce experiencer arguments in subject position to contexts with verbs that do not have experiencer subjects. To do this, we use Experiencer-Theme verbs (e.g. *heard, understood, looked at*, from Ambridge et al. 2016) and Agent-Patient verbs (e.g. *nudged, kicked*). (Stimulus-Experiencer verbs are discussed in Section 3.)

(3a) Jennifer_AGENT nudged/pushed/kicked Amy_PATIENT.   [AGENT-PATIENT]
(3b) Jennifer_EXPERIENCER heard/understood/looked at Amy_THEME. [EXPERIENCER-THEME]

When comprehenders encounter a PPT in a subsequent sentence (e.g. *She was irritating*, *She was boring*), we predict that a recently-mentioned experiencer argument (e.g. Jennifer in (3b)) would be an ideal judge candidate. Indeed, McNally and Stojanovic (2017) note that a number of PPTs are derived from experiencer verbs (e.g. *to disgust: disgusting, to bore: boring*). Thus, we hypothesize that an experiencer verb is well-suited for providing an experiencer judge for a PPT in subsequent discourse. The experiencer argument (e.g. Jennifer in (3b)) is predicted to be more likely to be chosen as the judge of a PPT than a non-experiencer argument (e.g. Jennifer in (3a)). Crucially, if regular (non-PPT) multidimensional adjectives (e.g. *smart*) do not have experiencer judges, they are not predicted to show this asymmetry between verb types. To test this, we conducted a web-based questionnaire study using

Qualtrics software and participants recruited via Mechanical Turk. The method and design are described in Section 3, and the results are presented in Section 4.

3. Experiment: Method and design

In order to test whether people's interpretation of the judge/evaluator of PPTs and non-PPT multidimensional adjectives is influenced by the presence/absence of an experiencer, introduced by a verb in the preceding discourse, we conducted a questionnaire study that manipulated **(i)** the nature of the adjective[2] in the second sentence (PPT vs. non-PPT multidimensional adjective, ex.5) and **(ii)** the verb in the first sentence (Experiencer-Theme vs. Agent-Patient, ex.4).

(4a) First sentence (Experiencer-Theme verb): Jennifer looked at Amy.
(4b) First sentence (Agent-Patient verb):   Jennifer nudged Amy.
(5a) Second sentence: She was irritating. [Predicate of personal taste]
(5b) Second sentence: She was smart. [Multidimensional adjective]
(6) Whose opinion is it that the other person is {irritating/smart}? Jennifer / Amy / Narrator

Thus, we compare PPTs – e.g., *fun, confusing, boring*, whose judge is hypothesized to be an experiencer – to non-PPT multidimensional adjectives which are hypothesized to not be sensitive to the notion of experiencer (e.g. *healthy, smart, lazy*). The PPTs and non-PPT multidimensional adjectives were selected on the basis of prior work (e.g. Pearson 2013, Bylinina 2014, McNally & Stojanovic 2017).

The Experiencer-Theme and Agent-Patient verbs were selected based on Ambridge et al. (2016) and other prior works. Experiencer-Theme verbs have an experiencer subject (e.g. perception verbs like *hear* and conceptual verbs like *understand*, all selected from Ambridge at el. 2016's set of Experiencer-Theme verbs), unlike Agent-Patient verbs (e.g. *push, carry, poke*). Thus, whether the verb is Experiencer-Theme or Agent-Patient allows us to manipulate whether the context contains an experiencer argument that can fulfill the role of judge.

Native English speaking adults (n=60) read excerpts (ex.4-5) that they were told are from stories and were asked to imagine they were reading extracts from novels. They were asked questions (ex.6), probing participants' judge interpretations. Based on prior work (Kaiser 2015), processing of perspective-sensitive and subjective expressions can be modulated by the genre of the text (e.g. fiction vs. emails). Thus, in this study the stimuli were clearly presented as excerpts from fictional narratives. For each 'story snippet', participants were asked multiple-choice questions such as ex.(6) which is essentially asking 'who is the judge' for the PPT or multidimensional adjective. Participants could only choose one of the three answer choices (preceding subject, preceding object, or narrator, as exemplified in (6)); selection of two answer choices was not possible. Each participant answered the 'opinion' question for 16 target items.

The stimuli were purposely designed to contain ambiguous (masculine and feminine) pronouns. For example, in (5), 'she' could in principle refer to either Jennifer or Amy (see also Kaiser 2015 for related work, and Kaiser & Herron Lee to appear for a follow-up study where we used inanimates to render the pronouns unambiguous). This is important, because it means that the opinion expressed in the critical second sentence could be Jennifer's, Amy's or the narrator's. Thus, the ambiguity of the pronoun has the advantageous consequence of making the critical question ('Who thinks the other person is irritating/smart?')[3] maximally open-ended and unbiasing. (We also probed people's interpretation of the ambiguous pronoun, but do not discuss those data here due to space constraints. The results are in line with the conclusions we draw from the 'whose opinion' data for PPTs and non-PPT multidimensionals in this paper. See Kaiser 2015 for earlier work on a related topic using a similar method.)

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[2] We also tested non-judge-dependent nongradable adjectives in another phase of the study, but they are not relevant for the data and research questions being discussed in this paper. The 'whose opinion' question in (6)) is not applicable to / not felicitous with non-judge-dependent expressions.

[3] One might wonder, however, whether the wording of the question ('…the other person…') would discourage participants from selecting the narrator as a possible answer. As we will see in the results section, this concern is unfounded, as the rate of 'narrator' responses is still fairly high.

To introduce an experiencer thematic role into the discourse, we chose to use Experiencer-Theme verbs (e.g. $X_{experiencer}$ *heard Y*), rather than the more frequent and larger class of Stimulus-Experiencer verbs (e.g. *X bothered $Y_{experiencer}$, X scared $Y_{experiencer}$, X amazed $Y_{experiencer}$*). To see why, let us consider the examples in (7a-b).

(7a) Jennifer heard Amy.   She was irritating.   [Subject-Exp verb]
(7b) Jennifer bothered Amy.   She was irritating.   [Object-Exp verb]

The Experiencer-Theme verbs we used have the experiencer in subject position (e.g. Jennifer in (7a)), whereas Stimulus-Experiencer verbs (which we did not test here) have the experiencer in object position (e.g. Amy in (7b)). With subject-experiencer verbs, if people interpret 'she' as referring to the preceding object (Amy in (7a)), it follows that the subject (Jennifer) is the experiencer of the irritation, whereas if 'she' refers to the preceding subject (Jennifer in (7a)), then the object (Amy) is the experiencer of the irritation. Similarly, with object-experiencer verbs, if the pronoun refers to the preceding subject then the object is the experiencer of being bothered and vice versa. Thus, in these kinds of sentences, the experiencer is the argument that the pronoun does not corefer with. This is important, because pronouns are known to have a general bias for referring to preceding *subjects* (e.g. Chafe, 1976; Crawley & Stevenson, 1990). Thus, if people have a general preference to interpret a pronoun as referring to the preceding subject, we might expect to see an overall preference for interpreting the *object* as the experiencer.

In other words, if we had used object-experiencer verbs, then a finding that the preceding experiencer object tends to be interpreted as the judge could have been attributed to pronouns preferring subject antedecents, rather than having to do with the adjective entailing a judge that is an experiencer. Therefore, we chose to Experiencer-Theme verbs, where the default pronoun=subject bias of pronouns might boost the rate of object (theme) choices and thus go against our predictions. Thus, if we nevertheless find a preference to interpret subject experiencers as judges, this cannot be an artifact stemming from pronoun resolution biases.

4. Predictions

We assume that Experiencer-Theme verbs provide an available experiencer argument for a subsequent adjective that seeks an experiencer judge, whereas Agent-Patient verbs do not. Thus, if PPTs entail an experiencer judge and 'regular' non-PPT multidimensional adjectives do not, we predict that people's interpretations of who the judge is should show sensitivity to verb type in the case of PPTs, but not in the case of non-PPT multidimensional adjectives.

More specifically, if the presence of an experiencer verb in the preceding sentence renders its experiencer argument (the subject) especially well-suited for being the judge of a subsequent PPT, the rate of subject-opinion answers to the 'whose opinion' question (see ex.(6)) should be higher with verbs like *look at* (Experiencer-Theme verbs) than with verbs like *nudge* (Agent-Patient verbs): The ExpThe_PPT condition is predicted to yield more subject-opinion responses than the AgPat_PPT condition. Crucially, we do *not* expect this asymmetry with non-experiencer-entailing multidimensional adjectives: If these adjectives do not involve experiencer judges, then people's answers to the 'whose opinion' question (ex.(6)) should *not* depend on whether or not the preceding subject is an experiencer. The TheExp_MultiDim condition and the AgPat_Multidim condition are predicted to yield similar proportions of subject-opinion responses.

Before turning to the results, it's worth noting that from a purely sentence-level syntactic/semantic perspective, the idea that the thematic role of 'experiencer' is available cross-sententially – i.e., that a referent's prior thematic role can 'linger' and influence the interpretation of a subsequent sentence – may seem unusual. However, there exists a great deal of literature on cross-sentential pronoun interpretation showing that thematic roles can play an important role in guiding pronoun resolution across sentence boundaries. In one of the earliest studies on this topic, Stevenson, Crawley & Kleinman (1990) compared verbs with different thematic roles, including Agent-Patient verbs (e.g. *hit*) and Stimulus-Experiencer verbs (e.g *admire*), and found significant effects of thematic role in people's interpretation preferences for a pronoun in a subsequent sentence (see also Kehler & Rohde 2013 for

more recent discussion of this data in terms of coherence relations). In light of these findings, as well as other claims that the judge could be conceptualized (at least in some cases) as a null referential ('little') *pro* that refers to a salient referent in the discourse model (e.g. Stephenson 2007), it does not seem unreasonable to consider the possibility that a referent's thematic role in prior discourse (and the associated semantic and pragmatic meanings) can influence how likely that referent is to be interpreted as the judge of a PPT.

5. Results

Figure 1 shows the proportion of subject's opinion, object's opinion and narrator's opinion responses in the four conditions. In other words, when asked 'Whose opinion is it that the other person is [ADJECTIVE]?', how often did participants choose the preceding subject, preceding object or the narrator? In all four conditions, the most common answer is 'subject's opinion', but as can be seen in the figure, the proportion of 'subject's opinion' responses is highest in the ExpThe_PPT condition. To test whether this is statistically significant, we analyzed the proportion of 'subject's opinion' responses using logistic mixed-effects regression models (lmer, R, R Core Team 2013). Our analyses focused on the proportion of 'subject opinion' responses, as that is what our predictions are centered on. The regression models included the maximal random effects structure supported by the data, determined by building the maximal possible random effects structure (all possible random slopes for by-subject and by-item intercepts) and then simplifying if necessary for convergence.

Statistical analyses of the proportion of subject responses reveal a main effect of verb type (p<.03; more subject-opinion responses with Experiencer-Theme verbs than Agent-Patient verbs), no main effect of adjective type, and crucially a significant verb-type by adjective-type interaction (p<.001). Indeed, planned comparisons confirm that (i) with PPTs, Experiencer-Theme verbs result in a significantly higher rate of subject-opinion responses than Agent-Patient verbs (p<.001), but (ii) with non-PPT multidimensional adjectives, both verb types yield comparable rates of subject-opinion responses (p>.6, i.e. no significant difference). In sum, whereas verb type matters with PPTs – which show a preference for experiencer judges – it has no significant effect in the case of multidimensional non-PPT adjectives.

We also find that, if we look only at Experiencer-Theme verbs, the rate of subject-opinion responses is significantly lower with multidimensional adjectives than with PPTs (ExpThe_MultiDim vs. ExpThe_PPT, p<.007), confirming that non-PPT multidimensional adjectives do not 'seek out' experiencer judges as strongly as PPTs do.


Figure 1. Proportion of subject, object and narrator responses to the 'whose opinion' question (Error bars show +/- 1 SE)

6. Discussion

The experiment reported here set out to test the claim that PPTs entail experiencer judges whereas the judges of merely multidimensional non-PPT adjectives do not need to be experiencers. To investigate whether experiencers are 'privileged' as judges for PPTs, we manipulated the type of verb in the sentence preceding the critical adjective-containing sentence. This allowed us to explore whether the experiencer subject of an Experiencer-Theme verb would be more likely to be chosen as the judge than the agentive subject of an Agent-Patient verb, and whether this was modulated by adjective type.

Our results show that with PPTs, in contexts where an experiencer is available (i.e., when the preceding sentence has an Experiencer-Theme verb), it is indeed a highly preferred choice as the judge (ExpThe_PPT condition) – significantly more so than an agentive subject (AgPat_PPT condition). In contrast, multidimensional non-PPT adjectives show no sensitivity to the verb manipulation: The rate of 'subject opinion' choices is the same regardless of whether the subject is an agent or an experiencer. As a whole, our results provide experimental support for the claim that a key property of PPTs – but not of regular multidimensional adjectives – is the preference for an experiencer judge.

6.1. Experiencer status or general reasoning/inferencing?

One question that comes up is whether our results could be due to general reasoning/inferencing about the relations between sentences (e.g. Hobbs 1979, Kehler 2002 on pronoun interpretation), rather than something specifically stemming from PPTs being sensitive to experiencer judges. Perhaps the idea that the judge of a PPT is associated with an experiencer is simply an epiphenomenon stemming from the fact that, during sentence comprehension, people automatically reason about how the content of one sentence/clause relates to the preceding and following clauses. More specifically, in a sentence like (8a), Jennifer is the experiencer argument of 'look at', but on a more general level, she is also a contextually salient individual with first-hand experience of the relevant person/thing, namely Amy's irritating behavior (see also Ninan 2014 on the Acquaintance Inference). Thus, perhaps a comprehender construes 'irritating' as being Jennifer's opinion/judgment not specifically because of the thematic role in the preceding sentence, but because, generally speaking, she is someone who presumably has personal experience with the relevant irritation-causing thing.

(8a) Jennifer looked at Amy. She was irritating.
(8b) Jennifer nudged Amy. She was irritating

However, it's worth noting that in sentences with Agent-Patient verbs, the subject can still be a contextually salient individual with first-hand experience of the relevant person/thing, as in (8b). In this sentence, Jennifer presumably nudged Amy for a reason, e.g. her irritation with Amy. We can infer that Jennifer experienced irritation because of Amy and that's why she nudged her. In this case, Jennifer is still a contextually-salient individual with the relevant kind of first-hand experience. Nevertheless, our results suggest that Jennifer is not chosen as the judge as often with these kinds of verbs as with Theme-Experiencer verbs. This suggests that being syntactically realized as an experiencer (rather than being inferred to be an experiencer) may render someone a better candidate for being the judge of a PPT.

Further work is required to investigate these issues more closely on the empirical level. It may also be that both general reasoning/inferencing processes and thematic roles guide how comprehenders interpret the judge of a subjective adjective – these two components do not need to be mutually exclusive.

6.2. Ease of shifting away from speaker as 'default' judge

An interesting pattern than emerges from our results is the relatively low proportion of 'narrator perspective' responses. Although people choose the narrator at least 20% of the time in each condition (indicating it is a possible answer), all four conditions elicit numerically more 'subject perspective' responses than 'narrator perspective' responses, as can clearly be seen in Figure 1. The relatively low rate of narrator responses may appear surprising, in light of the widespread view that the speaker is the default judge (e.g. Lasersohn 2005, Pearson 2013, see also Harris & Potts 2009, Patel-Grosz 2012).

However, recall that in our experiment participants were told they were reading snippets from narratives – in other words, the context was not a direct 'speaker communicating to addressee' context, but rather a fiction contexts where a narrator/author/writer[4] writes about the characters in the story, for a reader. We think that the narrative/fictional nature of our stimuli may be at least part of the reason why participants do not exhibit a default preference for interpreting the judge as the narrator.

In related psycholinguistic work on free indirect discourse (FID[5]), Kaiser (2015) investigated epithets/evaluative expressions and epistemic adverbials to see how participants interpret them – in particular, she tested who people interpret as the judge/evaluator of these expressions. Similar to the present results, Kaiser (2015) found that participants easily switch away from the narrator/writer/author to the point-of-view of one of the characters in the narrative and treat that character as the judge.

More specifically, Kaiser (2015) tested sentences like (9-10) and manipulated whether or not they contained expressions known to signal FID, namely (i) evaluative expressions/epithets (e.g. 'poor girl') and (ii) epistemic adverbs (e.g. 'probably'). Based on narratological work (e.g. Banfield 1973, McHale 1978, Fludernik 1993), epithets and epistemic adverbials are cues to FID. i.e., signal a shift to the point-of-view of one of the characters in the story. Thus, in (9b), if participants are sensitive to the FID cue, they should interpret the second sentence as Mary's thoughts about Elizabeth, i.e., with Mary as the judge of 'poor girl'. Similarly, if the epistemic adverbial signals FID in (10b), participants should interpret the second clause as Luke's thoughts about Andrew.

(9a) Mary looked woefully at Elizabeth. She was sick.
(9b) Mary looked woefully at Elizabeth. Poor girl; she was sick.
(10a) Luke glanced at Andrew warily. He'd put toothpaste in the shampoo bottle again.
(10b) Luke glanced at Andrew warily. He'd probably put toothpaste in the shampoo bottle again.

The results show that when participants were asked to indicate whose voice or point-of-view/opinion is being expressed in second sentence, (i) the rate 'subject's POV' responses was higher in the sentences with FID cues (epithets or epistemic adverbials) than in the plain/regular sentences and that (ii) in sentences with FID cues, the rate of 'subject perspective' responses was higher than 60% in all conditions whereas 'narrator perspective' responses were at around 20% or less. Thus, this earlier study also failed to find a default 'narrator/author=judge' preference.[6]

6.3. Conclusions and future work

Our experiment explored the claim that two kinds of subjective adjectives – predicates of personal taste (e,g, *fun, tasty*) and non-PPT multidimensional adjectives (e.g. *smart, healthy*) – involve different kinds of subjective perspective-taking. Whereas both classes of adjectives are commonly viewed as involving a judge/evaluator of some kind, it has been suggested that with PPTs, the judge is an experiencer, whereas the judges of merely multidimensional non-PPT adjectives do not (have to) have an experiential component. We tested this idea by means of manipulating verb argument structure in the preceding sentence, by using Experiencer-Theme verbs and Agent-Patient verbs. Our results show that PPTs, but not multidimensional non-PPT adjectives, are indeed sensitive to the presence of an experiencer thematic role in the preceding sentence, as signaled by participants' preference to choose the experiencer as the judge of the PPT. Thus, our findings provide some initial experimental support for the claim that a key property of PPTs – but not of regular multidimensional adjectives – is the preference for an experiencer judge.

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[4] Collapsing the narrator, the author and the writer is an oversimplification, but not crucial for the aims of this paper.
[5] Free indirect discourse is a narrative/literary style used to convey a character's thoughts, e.g. "Peter was getting really tired of sleeping on Tom's couch. How could anyone sleep on that old thing? He would go home tomorrow. Nothing would change his mind about that" (from Kaiser 2015). In contrast to direct speech and reported speech, free indirect discourse presents a character's speech or thoughts without embedding or explicit quotation marks (compare to: 'Peter thought, "I will go home tomorrow" ' or 'Peter thought that he would go home the next day.').
[6] It's worth noting that if we interpret the *character* whose thoughts are being conveyed by the FID as 'the speaker' (~'thinker') (and ignore the narrator/author/writer), then Kaiser's (2015) findings can be recast as epithets and epistemic adverbials having a default 'speaker' judge – it's just that the writer of the passage is not the same as the speaker, since the writer is 'channeling' the *inner speech*/thoughts of one of the characters by means of FID.

However, many important questions remain open for future work. As discussed in Section 6.1, one intriguing question is the extent to which these results stem specifically from the semantics of experiencers, as compared to more general reasoning and inferencing processes about how sentences in a coherent discourse relate to each other (or a combination of both). Another open question has to do with the nature of the relevant kind of experience. For example, could it be that non-PPT multidimensional adjectives did not show sensitivity to the experiencer manipulation because the sentences did not make reference to the 'right' kind of experience? For example, for X to judge whether Y is smart/clever, what kind of first-hand experience does X need? Although we used a range of Experiencer-Theme verbs (including perceptual and cognitive experiences), perhaps they were somehow too specific. We hope to investigate these issues in future work.

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