

Attributive *Wrong*

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1. Non-local modification

In well-behaved cases of adjectival modification, the adjective-noun sequence describes a first-order property whose content is fully determined by the contents of the adjective and the noun. For example, the truth conditions of *They hired a vegetarian dentist*, *They hired a former linguist*, and *They hired an electrical engineer*, are functions of the property of being a vegetarian dentist, of being a former linguist, and of being an electrical engineer, respectively.

I will refer to adjectival modification that is well behaved in this sense as “local”. While local modification is the rule, a number of “non-local” cases have been described in the literature. For example, the sentence *We saw an occasional raccoon* conveys that we saw a raccoon occasionally, and so its truth conditions are obviously not a function of the property of being an occasional raccoon (Bolinger 1967, Larson 1999, Zimmermann 2003). The identity adjective *same* (Carlson 1987), epistemic adjectives like *unknown* or *unidentified* (Abusch and Rooth 1997), and possibility adjectives like *possible* or *conceivable* (Larson 2000, Schwarz 2005) are also known to participate in non-local modification.

Non-local adjectival modification is a challenge for compositional semantics, as its analysis seems to call for special assumptions about the syntax or semantics of the adjectives in question.¹ In this paper I will present a case study on non-local attributive *wrong*, commenting on brief discussion in Larson (2000).² Larson derives non-locality in this case by equating non-local *wrong* with clause embedding *wrong* whose clausal complement has elided. I will argue that non-local *wrong* cannot in fact be so analyzed and that its semantics should instead be reduced to that of clause embedding *wrong* in the lexicon.

2. Non-local *wrong*

English *wrong* is at least two ways ambiguous. First, there is a “propositional” *wrong* that combines with a clausal argument. This is illustrated in (1), where the clause is an extraposed infinitival. Note that (1) presupposes that I opened that bottle, indicating that propositional *wrong* is factive. Second, there is a “predicate” *wrong*, which can be used predicatively, as in (2)a, or function as a local intersective modifier, as in (2)b.

- (1) It was wrong for me to open that bottle.
- (2) a. The answer is wrong.
- b. I gave a wrong answer.

Predicate *wrong* is synonymous with *incorrect* and selects subjects whose denotation can be thought of as having information content. Bottles being less likely information carriers than answers, for example, (3) below is less felicitous than the examples in (2).

- (3) # The bottle is wrong.

* For discussion of this material I would like to thank Junko Shimoyama as well as audiences at WCCFL 25 and the University of British Columbia. I owe special thanks to Gunnar Ólafur Hansson for bringing up relevant facts from Icelandic and for providing me with examples.

¹ As discussed below, a non-local adjective may not in fact have the syntax of a genuine modifier. Unless indicated otherwise, therefore, I use the term “modifier” in a pretheoretic sense.

² Space limitations prevent me from reviewing an earlier analysis of non-local *wrong* presented in Haik (1985).

Remarkably, however, (3) contrasts in felicity with (4) below. Naturally, as (5) illustrates, selectional restrictions observed in predicative position are usually active in attributive position as well. The question is, then, why the selectional restriction observed in (3) is not attested in (4).³

- (4) I opened the wrong bottle.
 (5) a. # The carrot is empty.
 b. # I ate the empty carrot.

The answer that suggests itself is that there is a second use of attributive *wrong*, similar to attributive predicate *wrong* in surface syntax, but different in semantic interpretation. Two additional data points lend support to this view. First, a sentence like (6) below is ambiguous. It can be interpreted as having the entailment (7)a, due to predicate *wrong*, but also as entailing (7)b. Second, it is possible for two occurrences of *wrong* to non-redundantly modify the same noun. Sentence (8)a, for example, can be interpreted as entailing (8)b.

- (6) We discussed the wrong answer.
 (7) a. We discussed an incorrect answer.
 b. We discussed an answer that it was wrong for us to discuss.
 (8) a. We discussed the wrong wrong answer.
 b. We discussed an incorrect answer that it was wrong for us to discuss.

Returning to (4), this sentence is judged to have the entailment in (9) below. It is apparent, then, that the adjective-noun sequence in (4) does not describe the property of being a wrong bottle, hence that the modification is non-local.

- (9) I opened a bottle that it was wrong for me to open.

The fact that (4) entails (9) moreover suggests that the interpretation of non-local *wrong* can be related to the interpretation of propositional *wrong*. The following describes and compares two different ways of doing this.⁴

3. Reduction in the syntax

In the analysis of Larson (2000), non-local *wrong* is an instance of propositional *wrong* disguised through ellipsis of its clausal argument. The analysis assigns sentence (4) a logical form like (10) below, where crossing out marks elided material.

- (10) [the λ_1 [*wrong*^{prop} [~~for me to open e₁]]] bottle] λ_2 [I opened e₂]~~

Propositional *wrong* in (10) is part of a prenominal reduced relative clause that modifies *bottle* intersectively. The object DP containing this reduced relative has undergone covert quantifier raising, and the ellipsis antecedent is the main clause remnant left behind by the raised object.⁵

Since this ellipsis antecedent contains the ellipsis site at surface structure, the ellipsis posited is of the “antecedent contained” variety, analogous to more familiar antecedent contained VP ellipsis. Thus the analysis makes (4) structurally parallel to a VP ellipsis case like (11)a, which in the analysis of Sag (1976), has a logical form like (11)b.

- (11) a. I read every book you did.
 b. [every book λ_1 [you did [~~read e₁]]] λ_2 [I PAST [read e₂]]~~

³ The point that attributive *wrong* can fail to impose selectional restrictions on the modified noun is made in Haik (1985, p. 136).

⁴ The adjective *right* seems to have much the same properties as *wrong*. I will confine attention to *wrong*.

⁵ The analysis thus assumes that a finite clause can license ellipsis of an infinitival clause. The reader is referred to Larson’s paper for a defense of this assumption.

Under this analysis of non-local *wrong*, call it the “syntactic reduction” analysis, (4) above is predicted to be semantically equivalent to (12) below.⁶ Sentence (12) in turn is judged to entail sentence (9) above. Therefore, the syntactic reduction account is successful in deriving the observation that sentence (4) too entails (9).

(12) I opened the bottle that it was wrong for me to open.

Note that according to the syntactic reduction account, non-local *wrong* is not strictly speaking a modifier, but is merely contained in a modifying relative clause. This is an attractive feature because it makes the analysis consistent with the restrictive hypothesis that all genuine adjectival modification is local and that ultimately all relevant cases of non-locality can be explained away as not involving genuine adjectival modification.

Despite this attractive feature, however, it would be premature to accept the syntactic reduction account. The remainder of this paper in fact argues that it cannot be maintained. The next section begins by describing another conceivable way of deriving equivalence of (4) and (12).

4. Reduction in the semantics

In an alternative to the syntactic reduction account, call it the “semantic reduction” account, non-local *wrong* is not equated with propositional *wrong* and no ellipsis is posited. Instead, the semantics of non-local *wrong* is based on the semantics of propositional *wrong* in the lexicon.

Consider the semantic interpretation of (10) sketched in (13) below. Under a suitable semantics for *wrong*^{non-local}, this interpretation can also be derived from the logical form in (14). The requisite denotation for *wrong*^{non-local} is spelled out in (15), which could be derived from propositional *wrong* through a type-shift, but could also be stipulated as a basic lexical entry. Assuming (15), the logical form (14) has the interpretation in (13), which establishes (14) as a conceivable alternative to (10) above.

(13) **THE** (λx . **WRONG**^{PROP}_w(λv . **OPEN**_v(x)(**ME**)) & **BOTTLE**_w(x)) (λx . **OPEN**_w(x)(**I**))

(14) [the [*wrong*^{non-local} bottle]] λ_1 [I opened e_1]

(15) **WRONG**^{NON-LOCAL}_w = λP_{et} . $\lambda D_{(et)(et)t}$. $\lambda Q_{s(et)}$. **D** (λx . **WRONG**^{PROP}_w(λv . $Q_v(x)$) & $P(x)$) (λx . $Q_w(x)$)

Note that, while the semantic reduction account derives (13) from a simpler logical form than the syntactic reduction account, this syntactic simplicity has its price. Unlike the syntactic reduction account, the semantic reduction account posits genuine non-local adjectival modification, as it assigns non-local *wrong* modifier syntax and makes the adjective-noun sequence denote a function from determiner denotations, rather than a first-order property. Unlike syntactic reduction, therefore, semantic reduction is inconsistent with a restrictive theory according to which all genuine adjectival modification is local.⁷

However, the question whether adjectival modification is indeed so restricted should not be prejudged. The present project is to evaluate the semantic reduction account on the basis of its descriptive adequacy, and comparing it with the syntactic reduction account will be a useful procedure in exploring the properties of the phenomenon under investigation.

⁶ This is so, at least, as long as prenominal reduced relative clause are taken to have the same internal and external semantics as postnominal finite relative clauses. This assumption may not be completely correct, as finite and reduced relative clauses can differ in temporal interpretation (Kusumoto 1999). However, as far as I can see, this potential difference will not actually affect the arguments made below.

⁷ In their discussion of non-local epistemic modifiers such as *unknown* or *unidentified*, Abusch and Rooth (1997) also express reservations about a lexical analysis of the sort formulated here, noting that there is no precedent for construing a modifier in DP as the main function in its clause.

5. Questions about syntactic reduction

The syntactic reduction account predicts that the properties of non-local *wrong* reflect independently attested general properties of ellipsis. The analysis will accordingly be undermined by observations requiring special assumptions about the ellipsis posited. Two observations of this kind are presented below.

Non-local *wrong* cannot operate on material from a preceding clause. For example, the second conjunct of (16) can be read as implying that you closed a bottle that it was wrong for you to close, but not that you closed a bottle that it was wrong for me to open. In the syntactic reduction account, the absence of the latter reading indicates that the logical form in (17), where the purported ellipsis takes a clause external antecedent, is unavailable.

- (16) I opened the wrong bottle and you closed the wrong bottle.
 (17) * [the bottle λ_1 [*wrong*^{PROP} [~~for me to open~~ e_1]]] λ_2 [I opened e_2] and
 [the bottle λ_1 [*wrong*^{PROP} [~~for me to open~~ e_1]]] λ_2 [you closed e_2]]

This restriction is unexpected in the syntactic reduction account because ellipsis does not generally impose locality constraints on the relative positions of the ellipsis target and its antecedent. Kennedy (1998) makes this point for antecedent contained VP ellipsis in particular. For example, the second conjunct in (18) below can mean that you hate every movie John hates or that you hate every movie John likes. In contrast to (17), therefore, the logical form in (19) must be considered well-formed.

- (18) I like every movie Mary does, and you hate every movie John does.
 (19) [every movie λ_1 [Mary does [~~like~~ e_1]]] λ_2 [I PRES [like e_2]] and
 [every movie λ_1 [John does [~~like~~ e_1]]] λ_2 [you PRES [hate e_2]]]

Another type of locality constraint on non-local *wrong* is illustrated by (20), which only permits an infelicitous local interpretation, suggesting that non-local *wrong* cannot appear in the scope of a higher modifier within its DP. This is again not a general constraint on ellipsis; as sentence (21) illustrates, antecedent contained VP ellipsis can target a verb phrase in the lower of two stacked relative clauses.

- (20) # I opened the cheap wrong bottle.
 (21) I ate everything [I could] [that they gave me].

Note that the semantic reduction account has no problem with the observations above. It straightforwardly forces non-local *wrong* to operate on clause internal material in (16); and it excludes non-local *wrong* in (20) as a type-mismatch, since non-local *wrong* requires a determiner denotation as its second argument, rather than an adjective denotation.

While the English cases above suggest that the syntactic reduction account overgenerates, cross-linguistic data also present a problem of undergeneration. In Icelandic, in particular, non-local *wrong* cannot plausibly be equated with propositional *wrong*. To illustrate, *vitlaus* ‘stupid, wrong’ in (22) below has a non-local interpretation.

- (22) Við ræddum vitlaus-t svar.
 we discussed wrong-indef answer.indef
 ‘We discussed the wrong answer.’

This use of *vitlaus* cannot plausibly be analyzed as an occurrence of propositional *wrong* because *vitlaus* in Icelandic does not have an independently attested propositional use in the first place; only the adjective *rangur* ‘wrong’ has this function in the language. At least in Icelandic, therefore, a syntactic reduction account is insufficient.

The data presented above still do not categorically exclude a syntactic reduction account for English, though. Non-locality may have different sources in different languages; and while the locality

restrictions on English non-local *wrong* detected above do not follow under current the understanding of ellipsis, this understanding may of course be incorrect or incomplete.

However, in the next section a more clear-cut problem for the syntactic reduction account emerges from close examination of the meaning of non-local *wrong*.

6. Excluding syntactic reduction

We will see below that (13) above is not in fact an adequate description of the interpretation of (4) and that the semantic reduction account, but not the syntactic reduction account, can be suitably amended. Section 6.1 first identifies a problem that can be handled in minor revisions of both analyses; section 6.2 then presents an observation that can only be accommodated in a semantic reduction account.

6.1 Definiteness

The syntactic reduction account and the semantic reduction account are alternative ways of assigning sentence (4) the interpretation in (13), repeated below. However, closer inspection reveals that (13) does not in fact describe the meaning of sentence (4) accurately.

(13) **THE** (λx . **WRONG**^{PROP}_w(λv . **OPEN**_v(x)(**ME**)) & **BOTTLE**_w(x)) (λx . **OPEN**_w(x)(**I**))

One problem arises because propositional *wrong* is factive and because *the* triggers an existence presupposition. Given factivity of propositional *wrong*, the argument of **THE** in (13) characterizes a set of bottles that I actually opened, namely the set of all bottles that I opened even though I was not supposed to. Therefore, with **THE** contributing an existence presupposition, (13) predicts (4) to presuppose the truth of (9) above, repeated below.

(9) I opened a bottle that it was wrong for me to open.

The prediction that (4) implies (9) is of course unobjectionable. However, it seems that (9) is not actually a presupposition of (4), but rather is asserted content. First, intuitions suggest that (9) is not a condition on the felicity of sentence (4), but merely a condition on its truth. Second, the implication (9) does not show the projection behavior of a presupposition. In particular, sentence (23) below does not imply (9), illustrating that unlike a presupposition, the implication in question does not project from the scope of negation.

(23) I didn't open the wrong bottle.

In this respect, (23) is different from the negated version of sentence (12), shown in (24) below. Unlike (23), sentence (24) does carry the expected presupposition that I opened a bottle that I was wrong for me to open. In fact, as expected, (24) is judged to be semantically inconsistent, implying that I did not open a bottle that I actually opened. This is in sharp contrast to (23), where no inconsistency is perceived.

(24) I didn't open the bottle that it was wrong for me to open.

In a proper semantic analysis of sentence (4), therefore, either the factive presupposition triggered by propositional *wrong* or the existence presupposition triggered by *the* must be eliminated.

It can be shown, moreover, that merely eliminating the former presupposition leads to another type of inadequacy. If propositional *wrong* were not factive, the argument of **THE** in (13) would characterize the set of bottles that I was not supposed to open, a set that may include both bottles that I actually opened and bottles that I did not. Since *the* also triggers a uniqueness presupposition, (4) is then predicted to imply that there is at most one bottle that I was not supposed to open. This prediction is incorrect. To illustrate, consider the scenarios sketched in (25) below. While scenario (25)a presents

one bottle that I was not supposed to open, (25)b features two such bottles. Despite this difference, sentence (4) is as true and felicitous a description of scenario (25)b as it is of (25)a.

- (25)a. There were two bottles of wine: one red, one white.
I was supposed to open the red, but not the white.
I only opened the white.
- b. There were three bottles of wine: one red, two whites.
I was supposed to open the red, but not the whites.
I only opened one of the whites.

The determiner *the* in (4) thus does not seem to trigger the presuppositions ordinarily contributed by occurrences of the definite article. In one possible analysis, this is because the occurrence of *the* in (4) is an exceptional realization of the indefinite article ordinarily pronounced as *a*. This interpretation of the data is further motivated by two additional observations. The first observation is that *the wrong* DPs can be like indefinites and unlike ordinary definites in being acceptable as pivots of existential *there*-sentences. This is illustrated by (26) below, which Abbott (2001) reports to be acceptable.

- (26) There was the wrong address written on the envelope.

The second observation comes again from Icelandic. Spoken Icelandic does not have free standing definite and indefinite articles, but instead marks definiteness through suffixation on the noun and on any modifying adjectives. Consider again example (22) above, repeated below.

- (22) Við ræddum vitlaus-t svar.
we discussed wrong-indef answer.indef
'We discussed the wrong answer.'

This sentence, which allows for a non-local interpretation, features the indefinite forms of *vitlaus* 'wrong' and *svar* 'answer'. It contrasts with (27) below, which contains the definite forms of *vitlaus* and *svar* and only permits a local interpretation. Thus in Icelandic, indefinite DPs can host non-local *wrong*, while definite DPs cannot.

- (27) Við ræddum vitlaus-a svar-ið.
we discussed wrong-def answer-def
'We discussed the incorrect answer.'

It does not seem implausible to assume, therefore, that occurrences of *the* introducing non-local *wrong* DPs are indeed disguised indefinite articles.⁸ Both the syntactic reduction account and the semantic reduction account can be amended accordingly: writing *A* for the disguised indefinite article, the logical forms in (10) and (14) above can be replaced with those in (28) and (29).

- (28) [A bottle λ_1 [*wrong*^{prop} [~~for me to open~~ e_1]]] λ_2 [I opened e_2]
(29) [A [*wrong*^{non-local} bottle]] λ_1 [I opened e_1]

Both logical forms are assigned the semantic interpretation sketched in (30). Assuming that the indefinite article is a plain existential, (30) is equivalent to (31), which is true if and only if I opened a bottle that I was not supposed to open.⁹

⁸ For somewhat different reasons, Haïk (1985) also proposes that non-local *wrong* DPs have the semantics of indefinites. (In contrast to the present proposal, though, Haïk stipulates that the indefinites in question must be interpreted as "specific".) There are other cases where the definite article appears to be semantically indefinite, including DPs with *the same* (Haïk 1985) and certain superlative DPs (Szabolcsi 1986, Heim 1999, Sharvit and Stateva 2002).

⁹ This revised analysis is consistent with factivity of propositional *wrong*, as the factive presupposition triggered in (31) can be assumed to be satisfied sentence internally: note that sentence (9) above, which paraphrases (31), does not as a whole carry a presupposition triggered by *wrong*.

(30) $\mathbf{A} (\lambda x. \mathbf{WRONG}^{\text{PROP}}_w(\lambda v. \mathbf{OPEN}_v(x)(\mathbf{ME})) \ \& \ \mathbf{BOTTLE}_w(x)) (\lambda x. \mathbf{OPEN}_w(x)(\mathbf{I}))$

(31) $\exists x[\mathbf{BOTTLE}_w(x) \ \& \ \mathbf{OPEN}_w(x)(\mathbf{I}) \ \& \ \mathbf{WRONG}^{\text{PROP}}_w(\lambda v. \mathbf{OPEN}_v(x)(\mathbf{I}))]$

Note that (31) also describes the truth conditions of sentence (9) above. As it stands, therefore, the present account does not merely predict that (4) entails (9), but it makes the stronger prediction that (4) and (9) are equivalent. However, an observation presented in the next subsection shows this latter prediction to be incorrect.

6.2 Reverse Implication

That (31) is not a sufficient condition for the truth of (4) is clear from the following observation. In the scenarios in (32), I opened a bottle that I was not supposed to open, hence these scenarios make (31) true. As expected, sentence (9) is judged true in (32). In contrast to (9), however, sentence (4) is not judged true in (32).

- (32)a. There was one bottle of wine.
I was not supposed to open it.
I opened it anyway.
- b. There were two bottles of wine.
I was not supposed to open either bottle.
I opened one of them anyway.

What sets apart the scenarios in (32) from those in (25) above is that in (32) there is no bottle that I did not open even though I should have opened it. This suggests that sentence (4) not only implies that I opened a bottle that I was not supposed to open, but also that I failed to open a bottle that I should have opened. This implication can be expressed as in (33), which conveys that there is a bottle that I did not open even though it was wrong for me not to open it.

(33) $\exists x[\mathbf{BOTTLE}_w(x) \ \& \ \sim \mathbf{OPEN}_w(x)(\mathbf{I}) \ \& \ \mathbf{WRONG}^{\text{PROP}}_w(\lambda v. \sim \mathbf{OPEN}_v(x)(\mathbf{I}))]$

The implication in (33) can be described informally as the “reverse” of the implication in (31) and so it may not be an accident that one of the possible counterparts of non-local *wrong* in German, the adjective *verkehrt*, can also mean *reverse*.

More importantly, the observation that (4) has such a reverse implication bears on the choice between the two types of analyses of non-local *wrong* under consideration. In a semantic reduction account, the implication (33) can be accommodated straightforwardly by suitably amending the lexical entry in (15). We can have an entry like (34), which derives the conjunction of (31) and (33) as the truth conditions of (4).

(34) $\mathbf{WRONG}^{\text{NON-LOCAL}}_w = \lambda P_{\text{ct}}. \lambda D_{(\text{ct})(\text{ct})t}. \lambda Q_{s(\text{ct})}. D (\lambda x. P(x) \ \& \ \mathbf{WRONG}^{\text{PROP}}_w(\lambda v. Q_v(x))) (\lambda x. Q_w(x)) \ \& \ D (\lambda x. P(x) \ \& \ \mathbf{WRONG}^{\text{PROP}}_w(\lambda v. \sim Q_v(x))) (\lambda x. \sim Q_w(x))$

In contrast, the reverse implication is beyond the reach of an analysis that equates non-local *wrong* with propositional *wrong*. For the syntactic reduction account to be sustainable, the logical form in (28), repeated below, would need to be amended in a way that derives the reverse implication. However, there is no plausible amendment in sight that would have this effect.¹⁰

¹⁰ The present characterization of the reverse implication is actually a simplification and will need to be refined. First, it is not clear that the reverse implication is indeed a truth conditional entailment, as opposed to a presupposition. Second, as Hotze Rullmann pointed out to me, (33) appears too strong. In the scenario in (i) below, there is no particular bottle that I was supposed to open, as opening any of the five bottles of white wine would have been acceptable. While the statement in (33) is false in (i), it seems that sentence (4) is actually judged true.

(28) [A bottle λ_1 [wrong^{PROP} [~~for me to open~~ e_1]]] λ_2 [I opened e_2]

The existence of the reverse implication thus excludes the syntactic reduction account. Naturally, however, this does not imply that the semantic reduction account presented here is the final analysis. One salient remaining issue is discussed in the next section.

7. The determiner restriction

Larson (2000) observes that the definite article *the* is the only determiner under which *wrong* allows for a non-local interpretation. The infelicitous sentences in (35) demonstrate, for example, that non-local *wrong* is unavailable in a DP headed by *a*, *every*, or *no*.

- (35) a. # I opened a wrong bottle.
 b. # I opened every wrong bottle.
 c. # I opened no wrong bottle.

Neither the syntactic reduction account nor the semantic reduction account derives this restriction. In particular, if both accounts analyze *the* preceding non-local *wrong* as a disguised indefinite article, they presumably cannot be extended to exclude the incompatibility of non-local *wrong* with indefinite *a* on semantic grounds.

I do not know of an explanation for the requirement that non-local *wrong* co-occur with *the*. However, the co-occurrence restriction may be taken to suggest that *the* and non-local *wrong* actually form a constituent, a complex determiner of sorts. Modifying the semantic reduction account, the logical form in (14) above would then be replaced with the logical form in (36) below. Assuming that *the wrong* has the non-compositional semantics in (37), (36) receives the same interpretation that (14) has under the lexical entry in (34).

- (36) [[the wrong] bottle] λ_1 [I opened e_1]
 (37) **THE WRONG**_w = $\lambda P_{et}.\lambda Q_{s(ct)}.\exists x[P(x) \ \& \ Q_w(x) \ \& \ \mathbf{WRONG}^{\mathbf{PROP}}_w(\lambda v.Q_v(x))]$ &
 $\exists x[P(x) \ \& \ \sim Q_w(x) \ \& \ \mathbf{WRONG}^{\mathbf{PROP}}_w(\lambda v.\sim Q_v(x))]$

This parse is made possible by the observation, illustrated in (20) above, that non-local *wrong* must always be adjacent to *the*. Its potential benefits go beyond making sense of the co-occurrence restriction on non-local *wrong*. Recall that under the original semantic reduction account, non-local *wrong* is in the way of a restrictive theory of adjectival modification in which all genuine adjectival modifiers combine with the nouns they modify into expressions denoting first-order properties. In the revised semantic reduction account considered here, just like in the syntactic reduction account, non-local *wrong* is no longer a counterexample to such a restrictive theory, as it does not have the syntax of an adjectival modifier in the first place.

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- (i) There were six bottles of wine: one red, five whites.
 I was supposed to open one of the whites – any of them would have done – but not the red.
 I only opened the red.

This observation can be taken to suggest that (33) is to be replaced with something like (ii) below. Taking **WRONG**^{PROP-NF} to be a non-factive variant of **WRONG**^{PROP}, (ii) conveys that there is a bottle that I did not open even though it would not have been wrong for me to open it; hence, as desired, (ii) is false in the scenarios in (32) but true in scenario (i).

- (ii) $\exists x[\mathbf{BOTTLE}_w(x) \ \& \ \sim \mathbf{OPEN}_w(x)(\mathbf{I}) \ \& \ \sim \mathbf{WRONG}^{\mathbf{PROP-NF}}_w(\lambda v.\mathbf{OPEN}_v(x)(\mathbf{I}))]$

Note that the difference between (33) and (ii) is minor in the following respect: in a semantic reduction account, the lexical entry in (34) is easily modified to derive the implication (ii) instead of (33), be it as a truth conditional entailment or a presupposition; in contrast, the syntactic reduction account cannot derive (ii) any more than it can (33).

At present, however, this proposal is speculative. The question whether a complex determiner analysis of *the wrong* is indeed viable and can be independently motivated must be left open here.

8. Conclusion

The evidence surveyed in this paper speaks against the suggestion, due to Larson (2000), that non-local *wrong* is an occurrence of propositional *wrong* within a reduced relative clause. The main argument against this analysis is that it cannot derive the proper semantic contribution of non-local *wrong*. Non-local *wrong* is better analyzed as a separate lexical item, or possibly as part of complex determiner *the wrong*. The denotation of non-local *wrong*, or the complex determiner, can be based on the denotation of propositional *wrong* in the lexicon.

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