

# The Definiteness Effect in English *Have* Sentences

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## 1 Introduction

English *have* sentences are known to exhibit a definiteness effect (DE) (Keenan 1987, Partee 1999) reminiscent of that found in existential *there* sentences (Milsark 1974, Barwise and Cooper 1980, Keenan 1987, etc.). The DE is a restriction against “definite” NPs in the complement position of *have*, including proper names, those occurring with the determiner *the*, and those occurring with “strong” quantifiers (Milsark 1974) such as *every*. This restriction is illustrated by the examples in (1). While (1a), with an indefinite NP complement, is an acceptable sentence regardless of context, (1b), with a definite/strong NP complement, is felicitous only in certain contexts.

- (1) a. Eliza has a/three/some sister(s).  
b. Eliza has #every/#the sister(s).

My goal in this paper is to argue that the DE of *have* reflects a discourse-pragmatic function of presentational focus, drawing on earlier proposals which give an analogous analysis to the DE in *there* existentials (Bolinger 1977, Hannay 1985, Lumsden 1988, Abbott 1992, 1993, etc.).

Below, I first establish that the DE is found with different kinds of *have* complement NPs, that is, both with NPs headed by relational nouns such as kinship nouns, e.g. *sister* and body-part nouns, e.g. *nose*, and with those headed by “ordinary” non-relational nouns such as *pen*. I argue that the DE of *have* is encoded as a lexically-imposed restriction on the complement of possessive *have* to be an indefinite NP, showing that definite complements are licensed by different (not necessarily possessive) senses, of *have*. That is, *have* is polysemous, and there is indeed a particular sense of *have* that licenses only indefinite complements. I argue that this sense of *have* encodes an underspecified possessive relation. I then propose that the DE of possessive *have* reflects a pragmatic function of presentational focus, showing that *have* exhibits a property of informational lightness that has been argued to be associated with presentational verbs in general. I support this proposal with an in-depth discussion of definite complement *have* sentences, showing that there are actually two separate senses of *have* that license definite complements, and these reflect the possessive and presentational components of possessive *have* in turn.

## 2 The domain of the DE with *have*

The DE in English *have* sentences has usually been observed for complement NPs headed by a relational noun such as kinship nouns, e.g. *sister*, *aunt*, or body-part nouns, e.g. *nose*, *hand*, (Keenan 1987, Partee 1999). I show in this section that a DE is also found when the complement NP of *have* is headed by “ordinary”, non-relational nouns such as *pen*, *mirror*, etc. Based on contrasts in the interpretation of definite and indefinite complement *have* sentences, I argue that the DE of *have* is lexically encoded, and thus that *have* is polysemous between one sense that requires an indefinite complement, and at least one other that does not. I propose that the sense of *have* requiring an indefinite complement encodes an underspecified possessive relation.

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## 2.1 Two kinds of *have* complements

English *have* is usually understood to encode a possessive relation, but possessive relations form a non-homogeneous category which can be divided at least into a class of INALIENABLE possessive relations and a class of ALIENABLE possessive relations (Heine 1997). Depending on the type of nominal complement *have* takes, a *have* sentence may fall encode either category of possession.

With a relational complement (e.g. *sister*, *nose* in (2a,b)), the *have* sentence takes on the inalienable possession relation of the complement head noun.<sup>1</sup>

- (2) a. Eliza has a sister.  
b. Eliza has a crooked nose.

With a non-relational complement (e.g. *mirror* in (3a)), the *have* sentence relation is interpreted as one of alienable possession or “control” (Jensen and Vikner 1996, Vikner and Jensen 2002), implying but not entailing ownership (3b).

- (3) a. Eliza has a mirror.  
b. Eliza has a mirror, but it doesn’t belong to her.

## 2.2 The DE arises with both kinds of complements

The DE in *have* sentences is typically noted for, and discussed in relation to, relational complements, that is, NPs headed by relational nouns such as kinship terms (e.g. *sister*, *mother*), or body-part nouns (e.g. *nose*) (Keenan 1987, Partee 1999). An example is repeated below from (1).

- (1) a. Eliza has a/three/some sister(s).  
b. Eliza has #every/#the sister(s).

A non-relational complement (i.e. one headed by a non-relational noun, e.g. (4)) to *have* does not seem to exhibit an obvious DE: the different determiners in (4) below do not seem to cause ungrammaticality.

- (4) Eliza has a/some/three/the/every mirror(s).

Despite the acceptability of the different NP complements in (4), *have* can still be shown to discriminate against definite non-relational complements. First of all, definite non-relational complements to *have* are odd discourse-initially, whereas their indefinite complement counterparts are acceptable. Secondly, even when not discourse-initial, *have* sentences containing a definite non-relational complement are not felicitous in all contexts, as illustrated by the infelicity of (5b) as a response to (5a). In contrast, an indefinite complement *have* sentence, e.g. *Eliza has a good mirror (too)* could be a felicitous response to (5a).

- (5) a. This is a good mirror.  
b. #Eliza has it.

Moreover, even in contexts that license definite complements to *have*, there are interpretational differences between definite and indefinite complement *have* sentences. In these contexts, an indefinite non-relational complement yields two possible interpretations while a definite complement does not. Consider for instance, a context in which someone (call this individual A) is planning on distributing gifts to various acquaintances. Another individual (B) asks the question in (6a), and A responds with (6b). The most natural interpretation that surfaces for (6b) is that A will give Eliza a mirror (with the

<sup>1</sup>I do not consider *have* sentences with a final XP, e.g. *Eliza has work to do*, *Eliza has a friend in Belgium* etc.

indefinite complement *a mirror*, or A will give Eliza some mirror that A assumes B to be familiar with (with the definite complement *the mirror*). In addition to this contextually-licensed interpretation, however, the indefinite complement *have* sentence allows a second, context-independent, interpretation of alienable possession or control. That this additional interpretation is restricted to indefinite complements and not allowed by definite complements is illustrated by the contrast in (6c).

- (6) a. What will you give to Eliza?  
 b. Eliza has a/the mirror.  
     “I will give Eliza a/the mirror.”  
 c. Eliza has a/#the mirror, so I won’t give one to her.

When the complement NP is indefinite, the *have* sentence in (6c) can be followed by the sentence *so I won’t give one to her*, explicitly denying the contextual interpretation for the *have* sentence. The interpretation of the indefinite complement *have* sentence in (6c) is then that Eliza already has a mirror (her own), and not that A is going to give Eliza a mirror. That is, the indefinite complement *have* sentence licenses a context-independent interpretation of alienable possession. With a definite complement, however, (6c) is contradictory. This is because the definite complement *have* sentence only yields the contextually-dependent interpretation that the mirror will be given to Eliza, but does not additionally license a context-independent possessive interpretation.

### 2.3 A meaning for possessive *have*

To capture this contrast, I propose a meaning for possessive *have*, i.e. the *have* that licenses the additional context-independent sense of possession even in a context that suggests another interpretation for the *have* sentence, as in (6c). I assume that the meaning of possessive *have* is as represented in (7) below, where  $V[+exist]$  restricts the complement of  $V$  to be an existential NP in the sense of Keenan (1987) (see Appendix).<sup>2</sup>

- (7) *have*:  $POSS[+exist](x,y)$

I assume further that the meaning of  $POSS$  is underspecified. It corresponds to the relation of a relational complement (8), or to the control (i.e. alienable possession) relation (9) if the *have* complement is non-relational. That is, when *have* combines with a relational complement, such as *sister* in (8a),  $POSS$  is interpreted as the *sister* relation provided by the complement nominal, and (8a) is interpreted as in (8b).

- (8) a. Eliza has a sister.  
 b.  $\exists x[\mathbf{sister}(eliza, x)]$

When possessive *have* combines with a non-relational complement such as *mirror* in (9a), the sentence is interpreted as expressing a relation of control or alienable possession. That is, (9a) has the interpretation in (9b).

- (9) a. Eliza has a mirror.  
 b.  $\exists x[\mathbf{mirror}(x) \& \mathbf{control}(eliza, x)]$

This analysis of possessive *have* yields a partial explanation for the DE we saw in the examples in (1), (5), and (6). First, a *have* sentence such as (10) is ruled out because its complement is not an existential NP. This generalization also applies to definite NPs such as *the N'*, accounting for the infelicity of (11) discourse-initially.

<sup>2</sup>I do not intend here to argue for any particular definition of (in)definiteness. Any semantic definition of (in)definiteness with the correct distributional results is sufficient for my purposes. For explicitness, I have chosen to employ Keenan’s (1987) class of “existential NPs”.

(10) #Eliza has every sister.

(11) Eliza has the mirror.

Turning back to contexts that license definite complement *have* sentences, the contrast resulting from the definiteness of the *have* complement in (6c) (repeated below) can also receive a partial account.

- (6) a. What will you give to Eliza?  
 b. Eliza has a/the mirror.  
 “I will give Eliza a/the mirror.”  
 c. Eliza has a/#the mirror, so I won’t give one to her.

If possessive *have* specifies for an indefinite complement, as stated in (7), a definite complement *have* sentence (e.g. (12)) cannot contain an instance of possessive *have*, but rather manifests another sense of *have*.

(12) Eliza has the mirror.

That is, the *have* sentence (12) in (6b) does not encode a possessive relation, but expresses some other relation licensed by context. To repeat, another sense of *have* is involved in (6b) that allows either a definite or an indefinite complement. In (6c), however, the contextually-licensed interpretation for (12) is cancelled by the following utterance.

In the same context provided by (6a), an indefinite complement *have* sentence (13) actually has two potential interpretations.

(13) Eliza has a mirror.

One is contextually-determined, which is also the only interpretation allowed for a definite complement *have* sentence, and is the interpretation found in (6b). This interpretation is licensed by the same factor that licenses the definite. The other interpretation is a context-independent one of control or alienable possession, and is the interpretation found in (6c). This extra possessive interpretation is allowed because the complement NP *a mirror* is existential. It is the remaining interpretation possible, given that the alternative, contextually-licensed interpretation has been cancelled by the following utterance.

That is, an indefinite complement *have* sentence can always yield a possessive interpretation because it is compatible with the requirement imposed by the representation in (7) for possessive *have*. A definite *have* sentence does not allow this context-independent possessive interpretation (although see below). It does not meet the [+exist] condition of possessive *have*, and by hypothesis, must involve another sense of *have*. This other sense of *have* which does not require an indefinite NP complement does however allow one, and thus in (6b) the indefinite complement *have* sentence is also compatible with the contextually-licensed interpretation.

The proposed meaning for possessive *have* successfully accounts for the felicity of indefinite complement *have* sentences across contexts, and for the availability of the context-independent possessive interpretation for such sentences even in contexts that license their definite complement counterparts. The proposal, however, still leaves unresolved the meaning of the *have* that licenses definite complements. That is, what is the *have* in (6b) if not possessive? Before answering this question, it is necessary to take a further detour into the DE of possessive *have*.

### 3 Why does *have* exhibit a DE?

Above, I argued that the DE of *have* should be captured with a lexical specification on possessive *have* for an indefinite complement. In this section, I suggest that this lexical specification for an indefinite complement reflects a discourse-pragmatic function of *have*: possessive *have* is a presentational verb.

It has a function of introducing new entities into the discourse. This proposal follows previous pragmatic analyses of the DE in existential *there* sentence as indicative of a presentational function of *there* existentials.

### 3.1 *The DE can be given a pragmatic characterisation*

The DE is well-known from English *there* existential sentences (Milsark 1974, Barwise and Cooper 1980, Keenan 1987 etc.). It is illustrated by the contrast between the effect of different determiners in (14). A post-copular NP with indefinite, “weak” determiners such as *a* and *some* is felicitous in all contexts, but post-copular NPs containing definite or “strong” determiners such as *each* and *every* are felicitous only in certain contexts (Abbott 1992, 1993).

(14) There is a/some/#each/#every boy in the garden.

The DE of *there* existentials has been argued by many to indicate a presentational function of these sentences. That is, existential *there* sentences bear a discourse-pragmatic function of introducing new entities into the discourse (Bolinger 1977, Hannay 1985, Lumsden 1988, Prince 1992, Abbott 1992, 1993 etc.)

Given that the DEs of *have* sentences and *there* sentences are at least very similar, if not identical, in distributional terms (i.e. in what kinds of determiners require contextualization of the sentence), a pragmatic account for the DE in *there* sentences points to a possible analogous account for the DE in *have* sentences. Below, I argue for a similar presentational account for possessive *have* sentences, showing that possessive *have* bears a property of INFORMATIONAL LIGHTNESS that is characteristic of presentational verbs in general.

### 3.2 *have meets a criterion of presentational verbs*

I begin by considering locative inversion constructions, which are largely agreed to be presentational constructions; i.e. to serve a function of introducing or re-introducing new or potentially forgotten entities into the discourse (Bolinger 1977, Penhallurick 1984, Rochemont 1986, Rochemont and Culicover 1990, Bresnan and Kanerva 1989, Bresnan 1994, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995). Examples of locative inversion sentences are given in (15). Locative inversion may take place around contentful verbs, e.g. (15a), or around the copula, e.g. (15b).

(15) a. On the wall hung a large painting.

b. On the landing was a chair.

Hartvigson and Jakobsen (1974:11) (5)-(6)

The verb in locative inversion has been argued to be informationally light (Birner 1995, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995), in two potential ways: it may be “inherently light”, or “light in context”. A verb such as *be*, which is not contentful, would be inherently light. This is the case in (15b) above. A verb would be light in context if it describes a typical state or activity of what the post-verbal NP denotes (Firbas 1966, Bolinger 1977, Babby 1980), or if its meaning is conveyed by the pre-verbal locative phrase. Birner (1995) illustrates this case with the example in (16) below.

(16) “But you, Eva: how did your travels go?”

She was about to tell him when *in again rolled the trolley, now with afternoon tea on it.*

Bowen (1982:167) from Birner (1995:247) ex.(30) (italics by Birner –tsw)

According to Birner (1995:247), *roll* in this context is informationally light under both the interpretations of “lightness in context” just noted. It is light in context because the sense of motion that it conveys is inferrable from the preverbal PP, since English *in* can be interpreted directionally. It is also light in context because the manner of motion it describes is typical of the object denoted by the postverbal NP:

trolleys typically roll. Indeed, the verb *roll* could well be replaced by a verb such as *come*, which does not specify manner of motion, without affecting the content of the sentence.

Returning to *have*, I now show that possessive *have* is also informationally light, both in context and inherently. In the one case, *have* is informationally light in context when it combines with a relational complement, e.g. (17). The relation described by the *have* sentence corresponds to that provided by the relational complement, and is not encoded by *have*.

(17) Eliza has a sister.

In the other case, *have* is inherently light as a possessive verb. When *have* combines with a non-relational complement, the sentence is compatible with different interpretations of possession, with varying degrees of specificity. Out of context, a *have* sentence with an indefinite complement NP, e.g. (19a), allows an interpretation of ownership between the denotata of the subject and object NPs. An ownership interpretation is not entailed, however, as (20a) is clearly not contradictory. Congruently, (19a) is an appropriate answer to the questions in (18), where all it conveys is that Eliza has some form of control over a mirror. In contrast, a possessive sentence headed by a contentful possessive verb such as *own* or *possess*, e.g. (19b), is at least less appropriate in response to the questions in (18). In the same way, a possessive sentence headed by *own* or *possess* does entail ownership: (20b), unlike (20a), is contradictory.

(18) a. What can I use to hold these papers down?

b. Can someone lend me a mirror?

(19) a. Eliza has a mirror.

b. #Eliza owns/possesses a mirror.

(20) a. Eliza has a mirror, but it doesn't belong to her.

b. #Eliza owns/possesses a mirror, but it doesn't belong to her.

The DE of *have*, similar to that of *there* existentials, and the informational lightness of *have*, support a view of *have* as a presentational verb. Exploiting these properties, I propose that the DE of possessive *have* is semantically encoded but pragmatically driven. That is, there are two components to the meaning of possessive *have* (i) encoding a possessive relation; (ii) presentation of new information. A potential consequence of this hypothesis is that there may be other senses of *have* that reflect these components of the meaning of possessive *have*. Below, I argue that there are two distinct senses of *have* that allow a definite complement, and that these senses do indeed bear out this potential consequence.

#### 4 Definite complement *have* sentences

I argued in section 2.3 that the DE of *have* stems from a lexical specification of possessive *have* that its complement NP is indefinite. Under this analysis, definite complements to *have* are consequently licensed by another sense of *have*. In this section, I argue that there are actually two other senses of *have* that license definite complements, and that these senses can be distinguished by the information structural status of the complement NP. In establishing this distinction, I further argue that these senses of definite complement *have* separately reflect the presentational and possessive aspects of possessive *have*. One sense of definite complement *have* requires its complement to constitute focus, i.e. new or unpredictable information relative to the rest of the sentence, but it does not specify a particular relation between the entities denoted by the subject and the complement. This sense reflects the presentational facet of possessive *have*. Another definite complement *have* allows its complement to be topical, (i.e. material that is assumed by the speaker to be “under discussion”, rather than as providing further information about some other entity) but specifies a particular sense of possession, that of control. This sense reflects the possessive component of possessive *have*.

#### 4.1 *Two kinds of definite complement have sentences*

Definite complement *have* sentences may be divided into two categories according to an information structural criterion of whether the complement must constitute the focus, i.e. information that is assumed by the speaker to be new or unpredictable to the addressee relative to the information carried by the rest of the utterance (Vallduví 1992, Lambrecht 1994).

(21) sets up a context in which a definite complement *have* sentence is acceptable, and in which this definite complement is focused. Suppose that a group of people are discussing their duties in a refurbishing project for a museum, and someone (A) asks the question in (21a). In the reply in (21b), the complement of *have* constitutes “new” information relative to what A is assumed to know: namely, that what Eliza is polishing will be all the mirrors.

(21) Context: a refurbishing project in a museum

- a. What’s Eliza polishing?
- b. Eliza has all the mirrors.

Alternatively, the definite complement can be topical, or at least part of the pragmatic presupposition (Lambrecht 1994), i.e. the relevant entity is assumed to be “under discussion”, and information is being provided by other material in the utterance about this entity under discussion. An example of a *have* sentence with a topical complement is given in (22b), where the *have* complement is an unstressed pronoun.

(22) a. Where are all the mirrors?

- b. Eliza has them. =
- c. They are with Eliza.

I discuss each type of definite complement *have* sentence separately below, arguing that they are licensed by different senses of *have* which are in turn distinct from possessive *have*.

#### 4.2 *A focused definite complement is licensed by a salient OP*

A focused definite complement to *have* is only felicitous when the context provides a relationship understood to hold between the arguments of *have*. Returning to the museum refurbishing project, this is the difference between the infelicitous exchange in (23) and the felicitous one in (21), repeated below. A comment such as (23a) does not provide a relation between Eliza and the mirrors that can be assumed to be salient in the context, and the *have* sentence in (23b) is odd here. In the exchange in (21), the question in (21a) makes it clear that a relation of polishing, or at least of being assigned to polish something, would hold between Eliza and some other item. The definite complement *have* sentence is felicitous with this understanding.

(23) a. Everything in the museum is at least a hundred years old.

b. #Eliza has all the mirrors.

(21) a. What’s Eliza polishing?

b. Eliza has all the mirrors.

That is, a definite complement to *have* is licensed when the *have* sentence can be interpreted as containing a salient presupposed open proposition (OP), which is a proposition containing one or more variables (Prince 1981, 1986, Ward 1988), and a focus constituted by the definite complement. In the examples above, (21b) contains the OP [Eliza is polishing X] and the focus X = “all the mirrors”. In contrast, (23b) is infelicitous because the context is too impoverished to license the inference of an OP.

### 4.3 Topical complement *have* encodes control

A definite complement to *have* can also be topical, however, as in (22b), repeated below. A *have* sentence such as (22b) has been said to be locative (Gruber 1976) because it can answer a *where* question (e.g. (22a)) and is paraphrasable by a *with* sentence (22c).

- (22) a. Where are all the mirrors?  
 b. Eliza has them. =  
 c. They are with Eliza.

I argue, however, that (22b) encodes a sense of control: a particular interpretation of possession. It is not locative. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, although a topical complement *have* sentence can be paraphrased by a *with* sentence, their entailments are different. Physical proximity is entailed by the *with* sentence but not by the *have* sentence. Thus in response to a question as to the whereabouts of something, e.g. (24a), a *have* sentence is felicitous even if the entity is not in the immediate vicinity of the speaker (24c), but a *with* sentence is not (24c).<sup>3</sup>

- (24) a. Where are the mirrors?  
 b. (in the bedroom) I have them in the bathroom.  
 c. (in the bedroom) #They're with me in the bathroom.

Second, the subject of definite complement *have* cannot be inanimate. While (25a) can be answered by a true locative sentence such as (25c), this locative sentence cannot be answered by a *have* sentence as in (25b).

- (25) a. Where are the mirrors?  
 b. #The bathroom has them. cf.  
 c. They're in the bathroom.

The reason that (25b) is infelicitous is simple: the relation of control entails that the “controller” is at least animate if not sentient. To summarize, I have shown that a topical definite complement to *have* is compatible only with a control interpretation for the *have* sentence. Note that although a topical complement *have* sentence must be given a control interpretation, a control interpretation for *have* is not necessarily restricted to a topical complement. For instance, the *have* sentence in (26) is felicitous, and has a control interpretation, but the NP *the car* is not topical.

- (26) (I can't come to dinner,) I don't have the car.

<sup>3</sup>Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.) points out that without the final PP, the *with* sentence, like the *have* sentence, need not be interpreted as expressing physical proximity between speaker and mirrors. Another member of the TLS 8 audience notes, however, that this may be the case only if the individual asking the question in (24a) is not physically present (e.g. in a phone conversation). If present, even without the final PP, the *with* sentence entails physical proximity whereas the *have* sentence does not. The pattern of interpretation is thus consistent with my claim. That the physical presence or absence of the addressee is relevant suggests a pragmatic explanation for how physical proximity is understood. I believe that a plausible story could go like this: the *with* sentence encodes location, entailing physical proximity. If the addressee is absent, physical proximity has a relatively looser interpretation (if the addressee is absent, the mirrors in the bathroom could be “with” the speaker even if the speaker were in the bedroom). If the addressee is present, the interpretation of physical proximity becomes narrower, since it would now presumably include the area where the addressee is located. Hence the looser interpretation for a *with* sentence when the addressee is absent. I leave the details of this issue aside, and note simply that a *have* sentence can be interpreted more broadly than a *with* sentence. That is, “being with” (location) at least implies “having” (being in possibly temporary control of), but not vice versa. Thus in answer to (24a), one can answer “I have it, but it's not with me”, but not “# It's with me but I don't have it”.

Below, I turn to the other side of the issue, and show that a focused definite complement to *have* does not require a control interpretation.

#### 4.4 Focused and topical complement *have* are distinct senses

The information structural distinction between the types of definite complement *have* sentences described above is more than a convenient classification. I discuss three distinctions between these sentence types, arguing that these distinctions are attributable to different senses of *have*.

First, unlike topical definite complement *have* sentences (e.g. (25)), a focused definite complement *have* sentence allows an inanimate-denoting subject. The contrast between the *have* sentences in (27) and (28) below, set in a context of decking halls for Christmas, illustrates this point. (27a) sets up the context so that the *have* sentence in (27b) contains a focused definite complement. The inanimate-denoting *the tree* is acceptable in this instance.

- (27) a. We need more trimmings for the tree.  
 b. The tree has all those lights we got last year. It looks fine. We need something for the fireplace, though.

(28a) sets up the context so that the *have* sentence in (28b) has a topical complement. (28b) is unacceptable because its subject denotes an inanimate entity. This example simply repeats the point demonstrated in (25) above. Both (25b) and (28b) are set in the same context as (22) above, but the *have* sentence *Eliza has them* ((22b)) is acceptable (and would also be allowed in place of both (25b) and (28b)). The only distinction between these *have* sentences is that in (28b) below (and (25b)) the subject denotes an inanimate entity, whereas in (22b), the subject NP denotes an animate entity.

- (28) a. Where are all those lights we got last year?  
 b. #The tree has them.

That is, focused definite complement *have* sentences do not require an animate-denoting subject but topical definite complement *have* sentences do.

Second, consistent with the contrast just illustrated, while I showed (see discussion of (24)) that a topical definite complement to *have* entails a control relation, a focused definite complement *have* need not encode control. I demonstrate this point further using *have* sentences in a context in which the members of a tour group are being divided up among different tour guides. Suppose the manager calls up a guide and asks the question in (29a). The guide can reply (albeit somewhat impolitically) with (29b), where the complement to *have*, *the old ladies*, is part of the focus. Here, the *have* sentence simply means that the speaker has been assigned to take the old ladies around, but does not entail that a control relation, however loose, has been established.

- (29) Context: a tour group which is being divided up among different tour guides  
 a. Who's taking which group around?  
 b. I have the old ladies, but I can't seem to find them.

In the same context, however, if the *have* complement is topical, as in (30), the *have* sentence yields an interpretation of control. Thus the *but* sentence following the *have* sentence is infelicitous, as the *have* sentence entails that the guide bears a control relation to the old ladies, but the following sentence contradicts this interpretation.

- (30) a. Where are the old ladies?  
 b. #I have them, but I can't seem to find them.

Third, there are languages in which topical complements to the verb HAVE are disallowed altogether.<sup>4</sup> An example of such a language is Mandarin, where the verb *yǒu* ‘have’, cannot occur in such *where* question contexts as (22).<sup>5</sup> (31) is a felicitous exchange, showing that a focused definite complement (in (31b)) is allowed for Mandarin *yǒu* ‘have’, parallel to the museum refurbishing context in (21) discussed above. (32) shows, however, that a topical complement is not allowed for *yǒu*. The question in (32a) ensures that *nà xiē jìngzi* ‘those mirrors’ in (32b) represents topical material, and (32b) is infelicitous.<sup>6</sup>

- (31) a. Sānmáo cā shénme dōngxi?  
Sanmao wipe what thing  
What is Sanmao wiping/polishing?
- b. Sānmáo yǒu nà xiē jìngzi  
Sanmao have that some mirror  
Sanmao has those mirrors.
- (32) a. nà xiē jìngzi zài nǎr ne?  
that PL mirror be.at where Q-PRT  
Where are those mirrors?
- b. #Sānmáo yǒu (nà xiē jìngzi)  
Sanmao have that some mirror  
Sanmao has those mirrors.

That one type of definite complement HAVE sentence attested in English is not attested in some other language supports the hypothesis that these different *have* sentence types manifest different senses of *have*. Summarizing, focused definite complement *have* allows inanimate-denoting subjects and does not entail a control relation. Topical definite complement *have* requires animate-denoting subjects and entails a control relation. Topical definite complements to HAVE are not available in some languages. These observations provide evidence for attributing these two types of English *have* sentences to different senses of *have*.

#### 4.5 Representing definite complement have

Filling out the picture of *have*, I provide lexical representations for focused and topical definite complement *have*. Assuming that lexical representations may specify information structural conditions (here represented via the INFO(rmation)-STR(ucture) specification), I propose the representation in (33) for focused definite complement *have* (SEM(antic)-STR(ucture) in a lexical representation encodes the grammatically relevant aspects of meaning). This sense of *have* (*have<sub>focus</sub>*) is semantically bleached but informational structurally rich: it specifies focus status on its complement. It does not, however, specify a particular relation between its arguments, hence the unspecified R at SEM-STR. The INFO-STR specification requires R to be part of a pragmatically presupposed open proposition, indicated by the subscript OP. This is intended to capture the contextually-dependent status of R in a focused complement *have* sentence.<sup>7</sup>

(33) *have<sub>focus</sub>*:

SEM-STR R(x,y)  
INFO-STR [<sub>OP</sub>λzR(x, z)](y)<sub>focus</sub>

In contrast, the control sense of *have* is semantically rich but it does not specify the information structure of its complement.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup>I use small caps HAVE as a cover term for counterparts of English *have* across languages, and use the italics to indicate the verb in each individual language, e.g. English *have*, Mandarin *yǒu*.

<sup>5</sup>Q-PRT = “question particle”, PL = “plural”.

<sup>6</sup>Parentheses have been placed around *nà xiē jìngzi* in (32b) because Mandarin allows pro-drop, and with another verb, the topical complement could have been phonologically absent. Whether present or absent, the *yǒu* sentence in (32b) is not a felicitous response to (32a).

<sup>7</sup>Although I claim that R is unspecified lexically, focused definite complement *have* sentences still favour a possessive or control-type interpretation. Most naturally-occurring examples I have seen of definite complement *have* sentences yield a control interpretation. This interpretational preference is only to be expected if this sense of *have* is, as I am assuming, a polysemy of possessive *have*, and speakers still associate the form *have* with a sense of possession. As I showed with (29) above, however, this sense of control should only be preferred but not entailed.

<sup>8</sup>It is likely that *have<sub>control</sub>* also requires the control relation to be part of a presupposed open proposition. This is because a context in which no relation at all is inferrable for the *have* sentence still does not allow a topical complement, e.g. A: *That’s*

- (34) *have<sub>control</sub>*:  
 SEM-STR    *control*(x,y)  
 INFO-STR

Finally, both senses of *have* are distinct from possessive *have* (*have<sub>poss</sub>*) in (7), repeated below, in that they are not specified for the feature [+exist]. That is, they do not exhibit a DE. Their restricted status is rather a result of information structural conditions (for *have<sub>focus</sub>*) and interpretational specificity (for *have<sub>control</sub>*).

- (7) *have*: POSS[+exist](x,y)

These senses of definite complement *have* provide support for the presentational analysis of *have<sub>poss</sub>*. If *have<sub>poss</sub>*, *have<sub>focus</sub>* and *have<sub>control</sub>* are polysemies of *have*, it is reasonable to assume that there is some overlap between their meanings. We can treat each sense of definite complement *have* as separately reflecting the presentational and possessive components of *have<sub>poss</sub>*. We can understand *have<sub>focus</sub>* as arising from the specialization of *have* to the pragmatic function of introducing relatively unfamiliar or unpredictable information. Similarly, *have<sub>control</sub>* can be understood as a specialization of *have* to a particular possessive relation of control.

## 5 Conclusion

To conclude, I have argued that the meaning of possessive *have<sub>poss</sub>* consists of a possessive component and a presentational component. I showed that the DE of *have* sentences arises partly because *have<sub>poss</sub>* specifies for an indefinite complement, represented by the feature [+exist]. I argued further that this specification has a pragmatic basis: *have<sub>poss</sub>* bears a discourse-pragmatic function of presentational focus, introducing new information into the discourse. This analysis follows pragmatic analyses of the DE in existential *there* sentences also as indicating a presentational function, and is supported by the informational lightness of *have*, a property shared by verbs in other presentational constructions. These components of *have<sub>poss</sub>* are further supported by the senses of *have* that allow definite complements: *have<sub>focus</sub>* is informationally even lighter than *have<sub>poss</sub>* but it contains a similar pragmatic component in directly specifying for a focused complement. The possessive side of *have<sub>poss</sub>* is reflected by *have<sub>control</sub>*, which encodes a specific sense of possession and is thus not “informationally light” like *have<sub>poss</sub>*, but it is freer in its information structure.

In many languages, the existential verb shares the same verb form HAVE as the possessive verb (e.g. Mandarin *yǒu*, French *avoir*, Malay *ada*). Although existential sentences in English are headed by *be*, the presentational function of English possessive *have* indicates a greater similarity between English *have* and its counterparts in the abovementioned languages than is immediately obvious.

## Appendix

- (35) A function  $f$  from properties to sets of properties is *existential* iff for all properties  $p, q$   
 $p \in f(q)$  iff the universal property  $\in f(q \wedge p)$   
 (Keenan 1987)

where the universal property (also called *exist*) is the property that is true of all entities in the model.

i.e.  $f$  is an existential function iff  $f q$ 's are  $p$ 's iff  $f(q$ 's who are  $p$ 's) exist.

A basic determiner (the morphosyntactic string) is existential iff it is always interpreted by an existential function (the semantic entity).

By (35), the determiner *some* is an existential determiner because (36a) and (36b) are true under the same conditions.

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*a good mirror*; #B: *Eliza has it.*, in contrast to A: *Where's my mirror?*; B: *Eliza has it.* Perhaps because control over an item is an enabling condition for locating it, the locative relation, inferrable from the *where* question, can license a *have* sentence in response. That is, *have<sub>control</sub>* may specify certain INFO-STR specifications. These are, however, still looser than those of *have<sub>focus</sub>*, as neither argument NP of *have<sub>control</sub>* is specified for information structural status. I leave the INFO-STR of *have<sub>control</sub>* unspecified since this point does not affect the main argument.

- (36) a. Some student is a vegetarian.  
 b. Some student who is a vegetarian exists.

The determiner *every* is not existential: the sentences “*every p is a q*” and “*every p who is a q exists*” are not always true under the same conditions. For instance, the sentence in (37b) is always true, but (37a) may be false in a model.

- (37) a. Every student is a vegetarian.  
 b. Every student who is a vegetarian exists.

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